Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 72
Issue 2 March 2019

Article 2

3-2019

Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts
Michael Sant'Ambrogio

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Courts Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Sant'Ambrogio, Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, 72 Vanderbilt Law Review 425
(2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol72/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Sant’Ambrogio_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

3/26/2019 2:13 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
____________________________________________________________
VOLUME 72

MARCH 2019

NUMBER 2

____________________________________________________________

ARTICLES
Private Enforcement in
Administrative Courts
Michael Sant’Ambrogio*
Scholars debating the relative merits of public and private
enforcement have long trained their attention on the federal courts. For
some, laws giving private litigants rights to vindicate important
policies generate unaccountable “private attorneys general” who
interfere with public enforcement goals. For others, private lawsuits
save cash-strapped government lawyers money, time, and resources by
encouraging private parties to police misconduct on their own. Yet
largely overlooked in the debate is enforcement inside agency
adjudication, which often is depicted as just another form of public
enforcement, only in a friendlier forum.
This Article challenges the prevailing conception of
administrative enforcement. Based on a comprehensive examination of
over eighty administrative courts, I find that agencies rarely enforce on
their own. Among other things, private parties may have procedural
rights to file regulatory complaints, trigger agency investigations,
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demand evidentiary hearings, join public enforcement actions as
parties, and even pursue claims without the involvement of the agency’s
enforcement arm. Although some administrative enforcement is
virtually indistinguishable from either public or private enforcement in
federal court, more often administrative schemes employ attributes of
both.
Combining public and private enforcement furthers the goals of
agency adjudication while mitigating some of the dangers posed by
transferring cases from generalist courts to specialized policymaking
bodies with less formal procedures. Public enforcement offers greater
political accountability and more coherent implementation of policy.
Private enforcement supplements agency expertise with the situated
knowledge of regulatory beneficiaries and enhances their access to legal
remedies. And diversifying enforcement inputs reduces the risk of
political or interest group capture of administrative schemes. These
tools are especially valuable today, as presidential administrations
increasingly use control over public enforcement to roll back statutory
mandates they cannot repeal through the legislative process. Enhanced
procedural rights for private parties can reduce capture of statutory
mandates, highlight undue influence, and facilitate judicial review of
policy changes implemented through agency nonenforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
The end of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic
increase in the number of private enforcement actions in federal court:
Congress wrote scores of statutes with express private rights of action;
for a time, courts regularly interpreted statutes to include implied
private rights of action; and to this day, private parties continue to use
them. As one rough proxy of the relative importance of private
enforcement, last year the United States was a plaintiff in only 3,298
of the 179,308 complaints asserting statutory claims filed in federal
district courts.1 Thus, enforcement in federal court is dominated by
private plaintiffs.
The situation is very different in agency adjudication, where
the government is ubiquitous. Administrative law struggles with
separation of powers issues that arise when the same agency that
drafts regulations also enforces them and adjudicates disputes over
enforcement.2 Critics of the administrative state argue that executive
enforcement in executive courts violates the Constitution and longstanding principles of Anglo-American law.3 Thus, the picture of
enforcement in administrative courts4 that emerges from the

1.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2
(June 30, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/file/24702/download [https://perma.cc/BC8N-B2HQ]
[hereinafter JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (June 30, 2018)].
2.
The major administrative law casebooks devote significant real estate to how agencies
separate their executive and judicial functions. See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN,
STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 124–37, 154–55 (4th ed. 2014); STEPHEN G. BREYER
ET. AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 711–741
(7th ed. 2011); RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 668–76 (7th
ed. 2016); WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND
CASES 220–21 (5th ed. 2014); GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 290–300 (7th ed.
2016).
3.
See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 228 (2014)
(criticizing the executive’s use of administrative courts to pursue enforcement actions against
private parties); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1246–47 (1994) (distinguishing between constitutional agency adjudications of “mere
privilege[s]” and unconstitutional agency adjudications of claims related to deprivations of “life,
liberty, or property”).
4.
This Article uses the term “administrative court” to mean a body within a federal
agency that adjudicates cases or claims. Thus, “administrative courts” and “agency adjudication”
are often used interchangeably.
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literature could not be more different than private enforcement in
federal court: administrative enforcement is just another form of
public enforcement, only in a friendlier forum.5
Or is it?
It is true that Congress nearly always creates a role for public
enforcers when it creates an administrative scheme.6 Yet a closer
examination of administrative enforcement reveals that agencies are
rarely the only parties involved in enforcement. Private parties also
typically play a significant role.7 Across the administrative state,
private parties have rights to file regulatory complaints, to trigger
agency investigations, to call for evidentiary hearings, to intervene in
public enforcement actions, and even to pursue enforcement actions
with or without the involvement of the agency’s enforcement arm.8
The expansion of private rights of action in federal court gave
rise to a robust debate regarding the relative merits of public versus
private enforcement of public policy. Advocates of “private attorneys
general”9 claim that private enforcement supplements the limited
resources of public enforcers, harnesses the knowledge of private
parties regarding regulatory violations, and reduces the costs of
agency inaction due to regulatory capture, political constraints, or
bureaucratic ossification.10 Yet others worry that private enforcement
undermines the political accountability of public policy, risks
overdeterrence and inconsistent regulation, and threatens a public
enforcer’s carefully calibrated enforcement policy.11 Consequently,
some scholars call for greater agency control over private enforcement
actions brought in federal court.12

5.
See sources cited infra note 13.
6.
See infra Section II.B.
7.
See infra Section II.C.
8.
See infra Section II.C and Appendix A.
9.
The term was coined by Judge Jerome Frank in Associated Industries of New York
State, Inc. v. Ickes. See 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943)
(“Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.”).
10. See infra Section I.B.
11. See infra Section I.C.
12. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1129, 1181 (2016) (suggesting agencies “devise the appropriate scope of private rights of action”
in federal court to prevent them from upsetting agency enforcement policies); David Freeman
Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013) (analyzing gatekeeping
of private enforcement in federal court); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private
Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 97
(2005) (arguing that Congress should “delegate the authority to create private rights of action to
the executive agencies charged with administering the relevant statutes”).
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Largely overlooked in this debate is private enforcement in
agency adjudication. While scholars have focused on the choice
between a public and private enforcer in federal court, they have said
little about the same choice in agency adjudication or why
policymakers might incorporate aspects of both public and private
enforcement in administrative courts. When the literature does
discuss administrative enforcement, it generally assumes an agency
will pursue enforcement and distinguishes that enforcement from
private enforcement regimes.13
Perhaps this oversight should not be surprising. Agency
adjudication has received less attention in recent years than
rulemaking or enforcement in federal court.14 Just as Congress and
the courts were opening the federal courthouse to private enforcement
actions, scholars were preoccupied with “the rise of rulemaking” by
federal agencies.15 Meanwhile, for many years, the Supreme Court
struggled with the constitutional limits of Congress’s power to
delegate disputes between private parties to non–Article III tribunals.
Some Justices even suggested that only cases with the government on
one side of the “v” qualified as “public rights” cases that could be
adjudicated outside of Article III.16 In addition, much of the
13. See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 8 (2010) (“When . . . the Department of Labor undertakes enforcement
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, it constitutes the archetypal exercise of state
capacity.”); id. at 33 (“[P]rivate enforcement regimes . . . use the judiciary as an infrastructure for
implementation of their agenda.”); HAMBURGER, supra note 3, at 228 (criticizing public
enforcement actions against private parties); Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17
LEWIS & CLARK. L. REV. 637, 641 (2013) (recognizing private enforcement in foreign
administrative tribunals but not in the United States); Lawson, supra note 3, at 1248 (“Consider
the typical enforcement activities of a typical federal agency—for example, of the Federal Trade
Commission.”). But see 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:31 (3d
ed. 2010) (explaining that in “[m]any administrative adjudications . . . someone outside of
government instigates administrative action by taking advantage of an opportunity, exercising a
right, or raising an important issue”); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Theories of Agency Adjudication
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing three models of agency adjudication
and distinguishing between public and private enforcement actions).
14. But see Michael Asimow, Five Models of Administrative Adjudication, 63 AM. J. COMP.
L. 3 (2015) (proposing a methodology for classifying different types of agency adjudication);
Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE L.J.
1634 (2017); Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV.
805 (2015).
15. Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the
1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2001) (“Although rulemaking had been around
for decades, it was only at the end of the 1960s that agencies turned to it as the primary staple of
administrative action.”).
16. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I adhere to my
view, however, that—our contrary precedents notwithstanding—‘a matter of public
rights . . . must at a minimum arise between the government and others.’ ” (quoting
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scholarship on agency adjudication has focused on government
benefits, which continue to comprise the bulk of cases decided by
agencies.17
The Court resolved at least some of its ambivalence concerning
agency adjudication of disputes between private parties in Stern v.
Marshall.18 Even as the Court limited the circumstances in which
non–Article III courts may decide common law claims,19 it seemed to
approve agency adjudication of claims arising under regulatory
statutes, regardless of the parties involved, and rejected a public
rights doctrine limiting non–Article III courts to actions involving the
government as a party.20 And just this year, in Oil States Energy
Services v. Greene’s Energy Group, the Court rejected Article III and
Seventh Amendment challenges to the authority of the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) to adjudicate the validity of patents in
disputes between private parties.21 Beyond the constitutional
questions raised in Stern and Oil States, however, few have examined
the relationship between public and private enforcement in agency
adjudication. Thus, the time is ripe for a deeper examination of the
role of private parties in administrative enforcement.
This Article begins that project. First, on a descriptive level,
the Article challenges the perception of regulatory enforcement in
agency adjudication as merely an administrative form of public
enforcement.22 Based on a comprehensive review of the Federal
Administrative Adjudication Database, a joint project of the
Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”) and
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment))).
17. See infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text.
18. 564 U.S. 462.
19. Id. at 484 (“[W]e have long recognized that, in general, Congress may not ‘withdraw
from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common
law, or in equity, or admiralty.’ ” (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855))).
20. Id. at 490–91:
The Court has continued . . . to limit the [public rights] exception to cases in which the
claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the
claim by an expert Government agency is deemed essential to a limited regulatory
objective within the agency’s authority. In other words, it is still the case that what
makes a right “public” rather than private is that the right is integrally related to
particular Federal Government action.;
see also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015) (affirming Stern and
permitting adjudication by the Bankruptcy Court of even “Stern claims” with the consent of the
parties).
21. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
22. See sources cited supra note 13.
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Stanford Law School,23 and dozens of agency rules of practice and
procedure, the Article maps the rights of public and private parties
across a broad universe of administrative enforcement schemes. It
finds that many administrative schemes combine attributes of both
public and private enforcement.
Second, on a theoretical level, the Article explores the function
of hybrid enforcement, opening up new lines of inquiry about how
Congress should balance public and private interests in agency
adjudication. Agency adjudication seeks to achieve three main goals:
(1) greater access to legal remedies for parties facing obstacles in
court, (2) more accurate and expeditious decisionmaking informed by
specialized expertise, and (3) implementation of more coherent and
politically accountable regulatory policies. But the tools used to
achieve these goals—informal procedures, specialized decisionmakers,
and political supervision—pose risks to the legitimacy of
administrative courts. Combining elements of public and private
enforcement can facilitate the goals of agency adjudication while
allaying some of the concerns raised by these tools.
Indeed, the legitimacy of agency adjudication may depend on
its ability to maintain a delicate balance between its public and
private character. Tilting agency adjudication too far in the direction
of a pure public enforcement scheme may undermine its legitimacy as
a dispute resolution mechanism outside federal court. At the same
time, tilting too far in the direction of private enforcement fails to take
advantage of the ability of public enforcement to implement a more
coherent, coordinated, and politically accountable policy. Agency
designers must strike the appropriate balance in each administrative
scheme based on the types of claims the agency hears.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I lays out the
respective roles, benefits, and costs of public and private enforcement
in federal court. Based on a review of the organic statutes and rules of
practice and procedure of eighty-seven agencies included in the ACUSStanford Adjudication Database, Part II then maps the attributes of
public and private enforcement in a broad universe of regulatory
schemes. Administrative enforcement includes a wide-ranging mix of
public and private enforcement tools. Some administrative schemes
resemble public enforcement in federal court; others approximate
private enforcement actions. But much administrative enforcement
falls somewhere between these two poles.
23. Federal Administrative Adjudication, ADJUDICATION RES., https://acus.law.stanford.edu
(last visited Oct. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W7SP-B5K2].
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Part III analyzes the function of hybrid enforcement—that is,
the combination of elements of both public and private enforcement
schemes—in agency adjudication. Public enforcement offers greater
political accountability and more coherent implementation of policy.
Private enforcement supplements agency expertise with the situated
knowledge of regulatory beneficiaries and enhances their access to
legal remedies.24 Diversifying enforcement inputs reduces the risk of
political or interest group capture of agency enforcement. Although
not without its own risks, hybrid enforcement can further the goals of
agency adjudication while mitigating some of the dangers posed by
transferring cases from generalist courts to specialized policymaking
bodies.
Finally, Part IV compares the merits of private enforcement in
administrative and judicial forums and uses several case studies from
the current administration to explore how enhancing private rights
might check political capture.25 In this way, Part IV contributes to
recent literature seeking to develop standards and tools for
restraining executive branch enforcement discretion.26 Scholars have
long grappled with the ability of agencies to use enforcement
discretion to shield changes in policy from judicial review.27 Private
24. See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Knowledge in the People: Rethinking “Value” in Public
Rulemaking Participation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185, 1187, 1197 (2012) (describing how
stakeholders have important “situated knowledge” about the regulatory environments in which
they live).
25. The Trump administration is not unique in exerting control over the regulatory state to
pursue its policy goals. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2246 (2001) (arguing that President Clinton “increasingly made the regulatory activity of the
executive branch agencies into an extension of his own policy and political agenda”); see also
Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for “Deconstruction of the
Administrative State,” WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/topwh-strategist-vows-a-daily-fight-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/
03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html [https://perma.cc/DY4F-ZBR6] (“The reclusive
mastermind behind President Trump’s nationalist ideology and combative tactics . . . declar[ed]
that the new administration is in an unending battle for ‘deconstruction of the administrative
state.’ ”); see also examples discussed infra Section IV.B.
26. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031,
1124 (2013) (examining “what more formal and transparent presidential enforcement could look
like”); Barkow, supra note 12 (suggesting ways to improve agency enforcement oversight); Mila
Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 105 (2017) (recommending judges “play a role in
encouraging executive branch actors to make improved” decisions.).
27. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 12, at 1169 (“[T]o have real judicial oversight of what
agencies are doing with their enforcement powers, a new framework of limited judicial review of
these settlements may be required.”); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a PrincipalAgent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1435 (2011) (proposing “a new framework for judicial review of agency
delays”); Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369 (2009)
(addressing the chronic problem of nonenforcement decisions).
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rights of action, paired with a requirement that agencies explain their
adjudicatory decisions, should make such changes more transparent,
subject to judicial review, and accountable to the electorate.
Agency adjudication continues to play an important role in
delivering access to justice and a more coherent and politically
accountable public policy. Far from being merely a cheap version of
federal court or a second-best alternative to rulemaking, agency
adjudication is essential to the goals of the regulatory state. But to
legitimately serve these goals, administrative schemes must be
carefully designed with an understanding of the dynamics of hybrid
enforcement. Moreover, beyond the question of regulatory design, the
complexity of administrative enforcement suggests that the Supreme
Court was correct in Stern and Oil States to abandon a public rights
doctrine based on the identity of the parties. Regardless of the formal
parties involved, much administrative enforcement implicates public
rights and private rights in ways that are difficult to untangle.
I. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN FEDERAL COURT
Private parties play a critical role in the enforcement of U.S.
regulatory law, filing the vast majority of statutory actions in federal
court. Scholars argue that “private attorneys general” supplement the
resources of public enforcers, address regulatory violations that escape
the notice of public officials, and mitigate the risks of government
inaction due to regulatory capture, political constraints, or
bureaucratic ossification. Yet private enforcement may also interfere
with carefully calibrated public enforcement policies, thus
undermining their political accountability and resulting in
overdeterrence and inconsistent regulatory requirements.
A. The Importance of Private Enforcement in Federal Court
Private parties play a more important role in enforcing
regulatory law in the U.S. legal system than in other advanced
economies.28 Although private actions arising under federal statutes
28. For accounts of the rise of private enforcement of regulatory regimes during the postwar
period, see STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017); FARHANG, supra note 13; John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669
(1986) (“American law relies upon private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law that
in other legal systems are left largely to the discretion of public enforcement agencies.”); and
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (“When the Civil Rights Act of
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have a long history, scholars noted a significant increase during the
latter half of the twentieth century. Between 1974 and 1998 alone,
Congress created 474 new causes of action.29 Indeed, “every major
environmental law passed since 1970 now includes a citizen suit
provision (with the anomalous exception of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).”30 In addition, for about fifteen years
following the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
federal courts liberally construed many federal statutes to recognize
implied private rights of action.31
Consider that 179,308 of the 281,202 civil actions filed in
federal district courts in the twelve-month period ending June 30,
2018 were statutory claims.32 But the United States was a plaintiff in
only 3,298 of these cases, or less than two percent.33 Private plaintiffs,
by contrast, filed more than 80,000 claims under antitrust, banking,
civil rights, environmental, labor, intellectual property, securities, and
consumer protection laws.34 During the eight years of the Obama
administration, suits by the United States never comprised more than
3.4 percent, and averaged about 2.6 percent, of the statutory actions
filed in district courts.35
1964 was passed, it was evident that . . . the Nation would have to rely in part upon private
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law.”).
29. Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607,
649 (2002) (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REVISION OF LIST OF STATUTES
ENLARGING FEDERAL COURT WORKLOAD (Sept. 18, 1998)) (“New legislative enactments, both civil
and criminal, ranged from consumer and environmental rights to workers’ protection and civil
rights.”).
30. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 185, 192.
31. Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1193, 1196 (1982) (explaining that federal courts increasingly recognized private rights of
action under regulatory statutes during the 1960s and 1970s). The Court has since retreated
from its willingness to find implied causes of action, however. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko,
534 U.S. 61, 67 n.3 (2001) (“Since our decision in Borak, we have retreated from our previous
willingness to imply a cause of action where Congress has not provided one.”).
32. JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (June 30, 2018), supra note 1.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C2 (Dec. 31, 2016), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_c2_1231.2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6A4K-4EJQ]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_
tables/stfj_c2_1231.2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7D3-RT5S]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/c02dec14_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HWS-FVS9]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS,
FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
CASELOAD
STATISTICS
tbl.C-2
(Dec.
31,
2013),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/C02Dec13.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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Two areas in which private enforcement is particularly robust
are civil rights and labor policy. In the twelve-month period ending
June 30, 2018, private plaintiffs filed 40,134 civil actions under civil
rights statutes and 17,514 civil actions under labor laws, dwarfing the
237 and 266 civil actions, respectively, filed by the United States.36
Even in what might be described as “core regulatory areas,” private
actions in federal courts exceeded the number of public actions
dramatically: 1,599 to 97 in environmental cases; 10,848 to 6 in
consumer cases; 605 to 14 in antitrust cases; 1,306 to 229 in cases
involving securities, commodities, and exchanges; and 644 to 1 in the
heavily regulated areas of cable and satellite TV.37
To be sure, the sheer number of private statutory actions
cannot tell the whole story. Some cases may have little or no
regulatory impact, while others may have significant repercussions.38
Public enforcers likely select cases with the most bang for the buck,
helping large numbers of individuals with fewer actions. But private
class action attorneys also file cases on behalf of large groups of
people. Moreover, tort and contract actions, which are not included in
the count of statutory claims, are regulatory in nature.39 They are not
created by Congress, of course, but they are part of the regulatory
background against which Congress legislates.

A3HE-83EF]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS
tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/
C02Dec12.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYL7-SXDA]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2011), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/statistics_import_dir/C02Dec11.pdf [https://perma.cc/28A7-2HC2]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2010),
[https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/C02Dec10.pdf [https://perma.cc/
55NZ-RTJS]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS
tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2009), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/
C02Dec09.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALW7-K8SP].
During the first full year of the Trump administration reflected in the Federal Judicial
Caseload Statistics (twelve-month period ending March 31, 2018), the United States filed 3,294
(less than two percent) of the 178,549 statutory claims filed. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/file/
24436/download [https://perma.cc/L4YT-5JUL].
36. JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (June 30, 2018), supra note 1.
37. Id.
38. See William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General” Is—and Why It
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004) (explaining that although most suits by private parties
under regulatory statutes serve both public and private functions, the mix varies across suits).
39. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward A Coherent
Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 391 (1995) (“[T]he common law itself was
merely a regulatory regime in which the government chose to prefer some interests over
others . . . .”).
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Thus, although it is difficult to measure precisely the relative
importance of public and private parties to regulatory enforcement in
federal court, it is clear that private parties play a critical, if not
dominant, role in the U.S. legal system.
B. The Benefits of Private Enforcement of Public Law
Scholars have identified a number of advantages to using
private rights of action in aid of public enforcement. First, “private
attorneys general” bring significant additional resources to the task of
enforcing public law.40 Both state and federal agencies are chronically
underresourced and overworked.41 Private enforcement regimes
enable policymakers to utilize private resources to subsidize the
pursuit of public goods.42 They may also provide remedies to
regulatory beneficiaries who are not sufficiently well organized or
numerous enough to secure the attention of public enforcers or whose
injuries are simply not high priorities in light of scarce public
resources.43 Moreover, the additional resources of private enforcement
may allow agencies to devote more of their own resources to activities
that private parties cannot perform, such as rulemaking,

40. See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 850–51 (2016) (“Effective
enforcement of civil-rights laws depends on private litigation . . . .”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing
the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42
MD. L. REV. 215, 218 (1983) (“The conventional theory of the private attorney general stresses
that the role of private litigation is not simply to secure compensation for victims, but is at least
equally to generate deterrence, principally by multiplying the total resources committed to the
detection and prosecution of the prohibited behavior.”); Stephenson, supra note 12, at 107
(“[P]rivate enforcement can provide more enforcement resources and facilitate more efficient
allocation of public resources.”).
41. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1410 (2000) (describing the
resource constraints of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 221 (1992) (noting
that Congress frequently gives agencies “difficult or even impossible tasks,” sets unrealistic
deadlines for actions, and then “appropriates inadequate resources” for the job); Thompson,
supra note 30, at 191 (“[T]he enforcement wings of both federal and state environmental agencies
are often woefully understaffed and underfunded.”).
42. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (finding an implied private
right of action in part because the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) does not have time
to investigate all potential violations of the securities laws).
43. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1294 (“[A]dministrative bureaucracies sometimes
tend to sacrifice the diffused interests of widely scattered beneficiaries in favor of the interests of
more cohesive and better-organized groups, such as regulated firms and the bureaucrats
themselves . . . .”).
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investigations, and prosecutions of difficult cases, creating an efficient
public/private division of labor.44
Second, private parties supplement the information resources
of public enforcers and may have better information about certain
types of regulatory violations.45 It is impossible for public enforcers to
monitor and detect every potential violation of law.46 Moreover, in
many cases injured parties have the most detailed and immediate
information about regulatory violations.47 For example, employees,
workers, and consumers will likely be the first to know of violations of
civil rights, workplace health and safety regulations, or consumer
protection laws.48 In addition, private enforcement may give rise to a
specialized bar that provides economies of scale, particularly where
class actions are available, and accomplishes some of the same
systemic reform sought through public enforcement.49
Third, private parties can bring enforcement actions when an
agency otherwise would not because of regulatory capture, political
constraints, or bureaucratic ossification.50 Thus, private litigation can
serve as an agency-forcing measure, or “safety valve,” when public
enforcers and the political branches are either reluctant or unable to

44. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 40, at 224–25 (“[I]t often may be more efficient for public
agencies to concentrate on detection (an area where they have the comparative advantage
because of their superior investigative resources) and leave the actual litigation of the case to
private enforcers, who are frequently more experienced in litigation tactics.”).
45. See Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 663–64; Gilles, supra note 41, at 1429 (“[T]he
federal government routinely looks to private citizens or entities to aid in the enforcement of
laws, often on the theory that the most likely initial source of information about wrongdoing is
the citizenry, whose millions of ‘eyes on the ground’ see far more than federal investigators ever
could . . . .”).
46. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969) (“The Attorney General has
a limited staff and often might be unable to uncover quickly new regulations and
enactments . . . .”).
47. See Gilles, supra note 41, at 1429 (“[T]he most likely initial source of information about
wrongdoing is the citizenry . . . .”); cf. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1298 (valuating the
relative costs of public and private enforcement). But see Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of
Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 579–80 (1981) (questioning whether private parties are more likely to
detect certain violations of the securities laws without the incentives of large sanctions, which
may skew enforcement).
48. See also Thompson, supra note 30, at 192 (“Citizen . . . [i]nformants often may be the
only source of information concerning midnight dumping, equipment tampering, the capture of
endangered species, and other covert violations.”).
49. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1298 (discussing “the relative costs of private
and public enforcement”).
50. See Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 664–65 (noting the tendency of public regulators to
underenforce due to capture or ideological preferences); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at
1226, 1298 (addressing capture and diseconomies of scale).
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enforce statutory mandates.51 In this way, private enforcement
regimes can enhance democratic accountability by promoting “fidelity
to statutory purpose.”52 Finally, centralized public enforcement is
prone to “diseconomies of scale,” resulting in bureaucratic ossification
due to “multiple layers of decision and review and the temptation to
adopt overly rigid norms in order to reduce administrative costs.”53
Private plaintiffs avoid these bureaucratic constraints.
Fourth, private parties can push agencies to interpret their
mandates in new, socially beneficial ways.54 Even when agencies are
not captured by a regulated industry, private attorneys may be more
adventuresome and forward-looking than public enforcers in the types
of cases they bring and the legal claims they pursue.55 Moreover,
enforcing and shaping regulatory policy through civil actions may
constitute a form of participatory government.56 Through private
litigation, the judiciary provides a channel for individuals and
nonmajoritarian interests to be heard on important policy choices and
public commitments.57
In sum, private enforcement supplements the financial and
information resources of public enforcers, mitigates the effects of
capture and other constraints on agency action, and contributes to the
evolution of the law in socially useful directions.

51. See Coffee, supra note 40, at 227 (“[P]rivate enforcement also performs an important
failsafe function by ensuring that legal norms are not wholly dependent on the current attitudes
of public enforcers . . . .”); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1295 (“Private rights of
action . . . give power to judges and self-selected private litigants to determine whether
enforcement is desirable in particular cases.”)
52. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1200.
53. Id. at 1298.
54. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 16 (2001)
(“Adversarial legalism makes the judiciary and lawyers . . . more fully democratic in character.”);
Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 664 (“Private enforcement regimes encourage legal
innovation.”).
55. See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1404 (1998) (finding private plaintiffs have generally
brought the most “cutting edge” cases under antidiscrimination laws). Professor Selmi also notes
how private plaintiffs first made use of testers to provide evidentiary support for housing
discrimination claims, a practice later adopted by government agencies. Id. at 1426.
56. See Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 666 (explaining that this type of participation is a
potential advantage of private enforcement and contributes to a broader democratic regime).
57. See id.; Maya Sen, Courting Deliberation: An Essay on Deliberative Democracy in the
American Judicial System, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 303, 312–15 (2013)
(describing how legal theorists position courts within a deliberative democracy).
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C. The Risks of Private Enforcement of Public Law
The core critique of private enforcement is that it shifts control
over regulatory policy from politically accountable public officials to
politically unaccountable private litigants and thousands of unelected
federal judges. In the process, private enforcement may upset
carefully calibrated public enforcement policies.58
The political branches exercise significant control over public
enforcement. The president appoints the key executive branch officials
overseeing federal enforcement, supervises them, and generally may
replace those who disappoint him. Although some public enforcers
have for-cause removal protections, they too seem to align themselves
more closely with the president’s preferences than with courts and
private plaintiffs.59 Despite some debate concerning the extent of
Congress’s control over executive agencies,60 it too possesses powerful
tools to shape public enforcement. In addition to its legislative
authority, Congress can initiate investigations, hold oversight
hearings, and flex its power over the federal budget.61 More generally,
58. See Engstrom, supra note 12, at 630–41 (exploring arguments that private enforcement
is “overzealous, uncoordinated, and democratically unaccountable”); Joseph A. Grundfest,
Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s
Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968–71 (1994) (arguing that private litigation is not an
appropriate enforcement mechanism because private securities class action litigants often have
divergent incentives from those at the SEC and are not subject to the same congressional
oversight); Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515, 569–82 (2016)
(evaluating ways in which privatization both distorts and empowers public litigation); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority To Define the Scope of Private Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1,
7–10 (1996) (suggesting that private litigation has the potential to eliminate the advantages of
agency-administered statutes by requiring the judiciary to particularize the meaning of terms in
a broadly worded statute); Stephenson, supra note 12, at 95 (arguing that Congress should
delegate the power to create private rights of action to the appropriate executive department or
agency).
59. See Terry Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 197, 220–21 (1982) (suggesting that presidential policy changes can affect the conditions in
which agencies operate, such as the economy, thus affecting how agencies’ behavior correlates
with different presidential administrations); Ryan C. Black, Adam Candeub & Eric Hunnicutt,
Political Control of Independent Agency Voting (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
60. Cf., e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2027, 2150 (2002) (suggesting that independent agencies are “more responsive to
congressional preferences” than the president’s); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1696 n.128 (1975) (questioning
congressional control of agency action); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic
Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission,
91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 767 (1983) (advocating “congressional dominance”).
61. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006)
(examining the complex and changing relationship between Congress and the administrative
state); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1227–28 (suggesting that Congress’s tools for
supervising the regulatory process might be preferred to relying on judges and private litigants).
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agency heads charged with implementing statutory mandates are
embedded within a national policy environment far removed from
most private plaintiffs and secondary to the work of federal judges.
Political accountability is valued in enforcement because the
statutory standards enacted by Congress are often broad and
overinclusive. Therefore, even absent resource constraints, public
enforcers are expected to prioritize the most egregious legal violations
and avoid actions that might be within the letter but not the spirit of
the law. Such enforcement decisions are ultimately judgments about
congressional intent (real or imagined) and the “public interest.”
Consequently, some level of political accountability is essential.62 Even
when private parties are driven by their good-faith understandings of
the “public interest,” there is no check from democratic institutions
over how they define this inherently contested concept.
Moreover, private parties are likely to choose enforcement
actions based on short-term financial incentives—i.e., expected
recovery—rather than their conception of the public interest, policy
goals, or other public-regarding values.63 If the financial incentives are
sufficiently alluring, private parties may bring cases that a public
enforcer would not based on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion or
a different understanding of the law’s objectives. Thus, private parties
may take advantage of statutory ambiguities to advance novel claims
inconsistent with an agency’s own interpretation of the law or its
policymaking agenda.64 They may also bring cases establishing bad
precedents that a public enforcer with an eye toward developing the
law would not.65 Even worse, private plaintiffs may bring “strike
suits”—nonmeritorious cases brought in the hopes that the defendant

62. See Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 670 (“Critics of private enforcement litigation
complain that it can be deeply undemocratic, unsuited to a political community committed to
representative democracy, electoral accountability, and legislative supremacy.”); Stewart &
Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1227 (“Electoral representation is the traditional mechanisms for
pooling collective interests.”).
63. See Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 671 (“[P]rivately prosecuted litigation is guided by
private (often economic) interests that may be in conflict with the public interest.”). But see
Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853
(2014) (questioning the traditional view of public and private enforcement objectives).
64. Engstrom, supra note 12, at 637–41.
65. Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
55, 69 (1989) (“[D]ecisions in citizen suits may create adverse precedents for future government
enforcement. Such a result could compromise all future enforcement, by government and citizens
alike.”); Engstrom, supra note 12, at 637–41.
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will settle rather than face the cost and bad publicity of protracted
litigation.66
Private enforcement also runs the risk of overdeterrence—i.e.,
enforcement actions in which the costs of enforcement and compliance
exceed the benefits of the remedy.67 To be sure, this concern is often
mitigated by the economic costs of litigation. Private parties are
unlikely to bring suit unless the benefits of enforcement are worth the
costs to the plaintiffs.68 But class actions can overcome this constraint
and result in damage awards that “exceed social costs and that do not
equal wealth forcibly transferred from the plaintiffs to the
defendants.”69 Such actions may weaken public support for the law
and regulatory enforcement generally, thereby undermining the goals
Congress sought to achieve. Moreover, even when a public enforcer
does bring suit, private parties may merely duplicate the public action
without adding any independent value.70 Conversely, private
enforcement alone may result in underdeterrence of certain types of
regulatory harms if the litigation costs are greater than the expected
recovery.
Finally, private enforcement is decentralized in ways that
impede the implementation of a consistent and coherent regulatory
policy. Thousands of “private attorneys general” may file suits without
coordinating their actions. Filings in district courts spread across
multiple circuits may result in inconsistent opinions in similar cases
due to the infrequency of Supreme Court review.71 Consequently,
regulated parties may face different legal requirements in different
parts of the country.72 Public enforcement also struggles with
consistency across the federal judiciary. But public enforcers can
facilitate more uniform enforcement through centralized control over
decisions to institute enforcement actions. In addition, agencies enjoy
greater deference from the courts on judicial review than litigants
66. Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 669; Grundfest, supra note 58, at 970–71; Stephenson,
supra note 12, at 116.
67. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1297.
68. Id. at 1290.
69. Id. at 1304.
70. There is some debate over whether private plaintiffs do in fact mostly “piggy-back” on
public enforcement actions. See Stephenson, supra note 12, at 128 n.117 (collecting literature on
the question).
71. Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 719; Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1292–93.
72. Pierce, supra note 58, at 8–9 (using “[t]he many inconsistent judicial opinions
purporting to define ‘owner or operator,’ as that term is used in [the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, to] illustrate the problems that are
potentially created by private rights of action” and noting that “[t]he judicial opinions are
massively inconsistent and incoherent”).
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pursuing private actions in federal court.73 Finally, agencies can
refuse to “acquiesce” in circuit case law in certain circumstances and
have better recourse to Congress in the face of adverse judicial
decisions.74
In sum, critics charge that private enforcement is politically
unaccountable, potentially wasteful, and risks creating inconsistent
regulatory policy driven by private parties and judicial preferences.
Missing from this debate, however, is any consideration of how private
enforcement operates in agency adjudication.
II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN
AGENCY ADJUDICATION
The relationship between public and private enforcement in
agency adjudication is different than in federal court. While the
government is involved in only a fraction of cases brought in federal
court, it is ubiquitous in agency adjudication. Yet most administrative
schemes are also designed to give private parties important roles in
enforcement. Indeed, many administrative schemes are best described
as hybrid forms of public and private enforcement, falling somewhere
on a continuum between the two.
A. The Scope and Breadth of Agency Adjudication
The number of agency actions potentially qualifying as
adjudication is enormous, even using the definition provided by the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The APA defines
“adjudication” to mean an “agency process for the formulation of an
order.”75 An order, in turn, is defined as “the whole or a part of a final
disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory
in form, of an agency in a matter other than rulemaking but including
licensing.”76 As Professor Ed Rubin suggests,
Every time an agency plans its future actions or evaluates its prior ones, allocates its
resources, gives advice, makes a promise, issues a threat, negotiates, conducts an

73. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding
that courts must give deference to agency statutory interpretation so long as the interpretation is
reasonable).
74. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2012).
76. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6).
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investigation, and most of the time it denies an application or makes an exception, it is
at least arguably engaged in informal adjudication.77

The APA provides special procedural requirements for so-called
“formal adjudication” if a separate statute requires the agency to
decide the matter “on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing.”78 Everything else is considered “informal adjudication.” Yet
Professor Michael Asimow has shown that much of the so-called
“informal adjudication” is actually quite “formal,” using many of the
same procedural requirements as adjudication conducted under
Sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA.79 At the same time, a vast
swath of informal adjudication might be “more accurately described as
executive action, or some similar term . . . . Most of the innumerable
administrative actions that fall within this category are unrelated to
adjudication, as that term is generally conceived.”80
Although defining the precise contours of agency adjudication
is difficult, this Article uses a definition borrowed in part from
Professor Asimow: an administrative process in which a federal official
uses an evidentiary hearing to resolve a claim or dispute involving at
least two parties (one of which may be the government).81 The federal
decisionmaker may be the head of an agency, an administrative law
judge (“ALJ”), an administrative judge, or another agency official.82
77. Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107–08 (2003).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57 (2012) (detailing the procedures of
administrative hearings).
79. Professor Asimow has identified eighty-seven agencies that conduct administrative
adjudications involving an evidentiary hearing. This includes both “formal” adjudication and
“informal” adjudication, as they are traditionally known, although Asimow’s study problematizes
this nomenclature. See MICHAEL ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES ACT 3 (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
adjudication-outside-the-administrative-procedure-act-final-report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P4UZN73] [hereinafter ASIMOW REPORT] (“[Some so-called informal adjudication] is even more formal
than the familiar trial-type adjudication procedure prescribed by the APA. In contrast, some
[formal] adjudication (such as the inquisitorial Security Disability program) is less formal than
many [informal adjudication] schemes.”); Federal Administrative Adjudication, supra note 23
(collecting a comprehensive picture of agency adjudicatory schemes, different types of
adjudication, and empirical data about administrative agencies). Professor Asimow argues that
“[t]he term ‘informal adjudication’ should be reserved for Type C adjudication which lacks legally
required evidentiary hearings.” ASIMOW REPORT, supra, at 3.
80. Rubin, supra note 77, at 109.
81. This comprises what Professor Asimow describes as Type A and Type B adjudications
and excludes Type C adjudications, which do not involve evidentiary hearings. ASIMOW REPORT,
supra note 79, at 3–5.
82. ALJs conduct adjudicatory hearings under Sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA and
are entitled to certain job protections and insulation from agency pressure. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.
§ 554(d) (prohibiting ex parte communications and supervision by agency personnel involved in
investigation and prosecution); 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012) (ALJs may only be removed “for good
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Defined as such, agencies adjudicate more cases each year than
the entire federal judiciary. The majority of these cases involve
disputes between the government and beneficiaries of social welfare
programs, federal employees, and government contractors.83 Congress
turned to government agencies to resolve such cases early in the
Republic’s history, as the needs of a growing nation outstripped the
ability of congressional committees to handle petitions for pensions by
invalid Revolutionary War veterans,84 relief from taxes and customs
duties,85 and claims to public lands.86 Just like today, Congress simply
did not have time or expertise to adjudicate all claims by citizens for
relief. Therefore, although Congress continued to use private bills to
handle some petitions, it increasingly turned to the executive and
judicial branches to adjudicate the bulk of individual claims upon the
government for relief.87 Today, the Social Security Administration
alone houses the largest adjudicatory system in the world, hearing
roughly twice the number of cases as the entire federal judiciary.88

cause established . . . on the record after opportunity for hearing.”). Administrative Judges (“AJ”)
are not entitled to the same protections under the APA, but frequently enjoy similar protections
under their organic statutes or the agencies’ own rules of practice and procedure. The “functional
independence accorded to AJs varies with the particular agency and type of adjudication . . . .”
The Federal Administrative Judiciary (ACUS Recommendation No. 92-7), 57 Fed. Reg. 61,760
(Dec. 29, 1992). But many AJs perceive themselves as similarly insulated from sanctions by
agency policymakers. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 278–81 (1994) (contrasting ALJ and AJ attitudes about judicial
independence). Today, there are far more non-ALJ adjudicators than ALJs in the administrative
state. See KENT BARNETT ET AL., NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS,
SELECTION, OVERSIGHT, AND REMOVAL 8, 17 (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.acus.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/Non-ALJ Draft Report_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SYE-2C4H] (reporting
10,831 non-ALJs and 1,931 ALJs). This Article refers to ALJs, AJs, and other agency officials
who preside over agency adjudication, collectively, as administrative judges or adjudicators.
83. OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: AN
INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE 40 (2003).
84. THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 105 (1995).
85. MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE 17 (2013).
86. Id.
87. See id. at 18 (describing congressional use of commissions as early as 1794 to adjudicate
claims arising from lost property during the Revolutionary War and distillery duties paid during
a drought); see also Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792) (describing an administrative
system for handling Revolutionary War veterans’ pensions). Professor Maggie McKinley suggests
that “the administrative state [was] an outgrowth of the . . . congressional petitioning [process]
from the Founding into the twentieth century.” Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of
the Administrative State, at *6 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Early petitions
were typically addressed to Congress rather than the executive because, unlike in Europe, the
executive was not thought to exercise sovereign powers. See FRANK J. GOODNOW, 2 COMPARATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS, NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF
THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, FRANCE AND GERMANY 136 (1897).
88. FISS & RESNIK, supra note 17, at 40.
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Since the nineteenth century, Congress has also turned to
government agencies to adjudicate regulatory cases—actions brought
to compel a private party to comply with a legal requirement or
remedy an injury to another party.89 In these cases, agencies exercise
the sovereign interest of the government in seeing that the law is
obeyed and in protecting the “health and well-being” of its citizens.90
When establishing an administrative forum for regulatory
cases, Congress often cites the need to provide relief to private parties
facing obstacles to recovery in federal court. This has been true since
the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) in
1887, right up to the creation of inter partes review in the PTAB in
2011. Congress established the ICC primarily to help those shipping
goods, in many cases farmers, whom neither the courts nor the states
would relieve from unreasonable and discriminatory pricing by the
railroads.91 Congress gave the ICC the power to hear discrimination
charges against the railroads, order monetary relief, and set
maximum shipping rates.92 Similarly, Congress turned to agency
adjudication to assist groups facing difficulty protecting their rights in
the courts when it enacted the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921,93
the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of 1927,94 the
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930,95 the National
89. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012) (discussing, inter alia, agency
adjudication of land disputes and steamboat safety); see also infra notes 91–99 and
accompanying text.
90. Seth Davis, Standing Doctrine’s State Action Problem, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 595,
601 (2015) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601,
607 (1982)) (discussing public rights).
91. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 253 (1982) (noting the view of the courts as the
“archenemy of the forces of populism”).
92. Id. at 257.
93. J.W. Looney, The Changing Focus of Government Regulation of Agriculture in the
United States, 44 MERCER L. REV. 763, 775 (1993) (“The reparation procedure is . . . designed to
give a quicker remedy for the injured party than litigation.”).
94. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–50 (2012); Kathleen Krail Charvet et al., Gilding the Lily: The Genesis
of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act in 1927, the 1972 Amendments,
the 1984 Amendments, and the Extension Acts, 91 TUL. L. REV. 881, 882 (2017) (“[The Act and its
amendments] reflect legislation designed to address judicial decisions wherein the Courts have
been presented with jurisdictional challenges . . . .”).
95. Congress enacted the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act “primarily for the
protection of the producers of perishable agricultural products - most of whom must entrust their
products to a buyer . . . who may be thousands of miles away, and depend for their payment upon
his business acumen and fair dealing.” H.R. REP. NO. 1196, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955),
reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3701; see also Nicole Leonard, The Unsuspecting Fiduciary: The
Curious Case of PACA and Personal Liability, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32, 32 (2006) (“[T]he goal of
Congress has been to protect the more vulnerable players in a vital area of commerce . . . .”). “The
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Labor Relations Act of 1935,96 the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974,97 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010,98 and the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act of 2011.99
Appendix A lists thirty-four federal administrative courts that
adjudicate regulatory enforcement actions. Appendix A was compiled
based on a review of the statutory authority and rules of practice and
procedure of eighty-seven administrative offices listed in the Federal
Administrative Adjudication Database as having at least one case
opened or filed in 2013.100 The line between regulatory and benefits
statute was amended in 1984 to create a statutory trust for the benefit of unpaid produce
suppliers.” Consumers Produce Co. v. Volante Wholesale Produce, Inc., 16 F.3d 1374, 1378 (3d
Cir. 1994).
96. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, or Wagner Act, sought to address “inequality
of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association.” National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)); see also Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C.
Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function
and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2035–36 (2009) (noting how “[t]he Wagner Act
declared employers’ militant refusal to recognize unions as the major cause of industrial unrest,
and the abuse of employer economic power as the major obstacle to improved labor standards”).
Professors Catherine Fisk and Deborah Malamud note, however, that the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947 curtailed these gains. Fisk & Malamud, supra, at 2034.
97. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389. “Concern over the inefficiency of remedies for
participants in the commodity markets led to a proposal to create a specialized forum for the
adjudication of disputes in commodity futures transactions.” Jerry W. Markham, The Seventh
Amendment and CFTC Reparations Proceedings, 68 IOWA L. REV. 87, 96 (1982) (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1974)). A new section was added to the Act “providing for
administrative reparation proceedings before the Commission by any person against persons
registered as futures commission merchants, floor brokers, persons associated with futures
commission merchants or with agents thereof, commodity trading advisors, or commodity pool
operators.” S. REP. 93-1131, at 96–97 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5868.
98. In her essay proposing a consumer financial protection agency, then-Professor Elizabeth
Warren noted the success with which creditors shielded themselves from legal liability to
consumers. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate: If It’s Good Enough for Microwaves, It’s Good
Enough for Mortgages: Why We Need a Consumer Financial Product Safety Commission,
DEMOCRACY (Summer 2007), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/
[https://perma.cc/YD6C-9HTY].
99. The America Invents Act expanded the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”)
authority to review the patentability of claims post patent issuance in order to “establish a more
efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary
and counterproductive litigation costs” in response to “a growing sense that questionable patents
are too easily obtained and are too difficult to challenge.” H.R. REP. No. 98–112, pt. 1, at 39–40
(2011); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money:
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 237–39 (2015) (discussing
problems with relying on federal district courts to adjudicate challenges to invalid patents).
100. The database is available at https://acus.law.stanford.edu [http://perma.cc/W7SP-B5K2].
It includes only caseloads verified by the agencies themselves. Two agencies are notably absent
from Appendix A because they did not participate in the Survey: the SEC, which adjudicates a
significant number of enforcement actions each year, see, e.g., Urska Velikonj, Reporting Agency
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cases is occasionally fuzzy, some agencies adjudicate both kinds of
cases,101 and reasonable minds may differ over whether to include a
particular agency.102 Nevertheless, Appendix A offers a broad universe
of agency adjudication from which we can begin to identify the range
of public and private rights included in administrative enforcement
schemes.
B. Public Enforcement in Agency Adjudication
When Congress turns to agency adjudication, it usually also
gives the agency a role in enforcement rather than simply moving
private enforcement into a non–Article III tribunal. Although the
government does not track enforcement actions by party in federal
administrative courts, agency rules of practice and procedure reveal
the ubiquity of public enforcement in agency design.
All thirty-four administrative courts listed in Appendix A hear
cases in which an agency is given enforcement responsibilities.103
These responsibilities may resemble conventional public enforcement
duties in which the agency inspects, investigates, and pursues
enforcement actions directly against regulated entities.104 TwentyPerformance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 923 tbl.1
(2016) (noting 610 administrative actions in 2014), and the USPTO, which adjudicates thousands
of disputes over intellectual property. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PTAB TRIAL
STATISTICS: IPR, PGR, CBM 3 (Oct. 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
trial_statistics_october_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/C43E-WPME] [hereinafter USPTO, TRIAL
STATISTICS] (reporting 7,074 inter partes review petitions by private parties in approximately
five years). Thus, Appendix A likely understates the number of administrative courts that
adjudicate regulatory enforcement actions.
101. I did not include agencies that adjudicate enforcement actions solely aimed at rooting
out fraud or corruption in a benefits program. See, e.g., Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note
14, at 1676 (discussing Medicaid postpayment audit programs).
102. Nevertheless, the literature generally recognizes a distinction between agencies charged
with the administration of benefits and regulatory agencies. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz, supra
note 74, at 748–49; Daniel J. Gifford, Federal Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past
Choices to Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 52–53 (1997) (recognizing distinction between
agency adjudication of public benefits and economic regulation); James E. Pfander, Article I
Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643,
659 (2004).
103. See infra Appendix A, col. A. The agency may not have enforcement responsibilities in
every type of case heard by the administrative court, however. In most of these cases, the same
agency that adjudicates the cases also has enforcement responsibilities, although separation of
functions rules often limit the communications between the two different parts of the agency.
104. The SEC and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) are good examples. Although the SEC
maintains an online form for filing “complaints/tips,” it does not “disclose the existence or nonexistence of an investigation and any information gathered unless made a matter of public record
in proceedings brought before the SEC or in the courts.” SEC Center for Complaints and
Enforcement Tips, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 4, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/
investor-publications/complaintshtml.html [https://perma.cc/WTN4-C7LN]. This is similar to

Sant’Ambrogio_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/26/2019 2:13 PM

PRIVATE ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT

449

eight of the thirty-four administrative courts in Appendix A hear
claims in which the government is the only party that may pursue an
enforcement matter requiring an evidentiary hearing.105 But even
when the government does not have exclusive enforcement authority,
it may have responsibility for reviewing, investigating, and
attempting to settle complaints filed by private parties;106 acting as a
gatekeeper for private actions;107 or intervening in actions brought by
private parties to represent the government.108
These findings are consistent with the perception of
administrative enforcement as another form of public enforcement.
Nevertheless, there are two important differences from enforcement in
federal court. First, Congress not only adds a public enforcer when it
creates an administrative court, it also nearly always changes the
identity of the public enforcer. Agencies must rely on the Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) to bring most enforcement actions in federal court,
but Congress usually gives public enforcement authority to an agency

how the DOJ acts in civil and criminal cases. “The [FTC] acts only in the public interest and does
not initiate an investigation or take other action when the alleged violation of law is merely a
matter of private controversy and does not tend adversely to affect the public.” 16 C.F.R. § 2.3
(2018). Nevertheless, the FTC also invites private parties to file complaints or otherwise request
FTC action regarding commercial practices that violate the acts it is charged with administering.
16 C.F.R. § 2.2 (2018).
105. See infra Appendix A, col. B. Note that administrative courts frequently hear more than
one type of claim and may be structured differently across agencies. For example, an agency may
have exclusive enforcement authority for most claims, but private parties may be able to pursue
others on their own.
106. For example, the Department of Energy’s Office of Hearings and Appeals investigates
and reports on certain whistleblower complaints, 10 C.F.R. §§ 708.1, 708.2 (2018); the Assistant
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development conducts investigations of and seeks to conciliate
complaints filed under the Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. §§ 103.215, 103.300 (2018); the Secretary
of Labor investigates complaints of discrimination under the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act, 29 C.F.R. § 2700.40 (2018); the Surface Transportation Board may institute investigations
on its on motion although it mostly hears private complaints; and the United States
International Trade Commission investigates complaints under the Tariff Act, 19 C.F.R. § 210.9
(2018).
107. The Secretary of Labor, for example, is directed to file a complaint under the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act if she determines after investigating a complaint that a violation
has occurred. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.40. The complainant “may present additional evidence on his own
behalf” during any subsequent evidentiary hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.4 (2018). Similarly, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development issues a charge under the Fair Housing Act
when it determines that reasonable cause exists to believe a violation has occurred. 24 C.F.R.
§§ 103.15, 103.400 (2018). “An aggrieved person is not a party but may file a motion to
intervene.” 24 C.F.R. § 180.310 (2018).
108.
The Secretary of Labor, for example, is directed to file a complaint under the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act if she determines after investigating a complaint that a violation
has occurred. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.40. The complainant “may present additional evidence on his own
behalf” during any subsequent evidentiary hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.
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other than the DOJ in administrative proceedings.109 The separation
of powers issues raised by combining enforcement, adjudication, and
rulemaking in agencies has been well tilled.110
Second, and less well understood, private parties play a more
important role in administrative enforcement than public enforcement
in federal court. As the next Section explains, private parties are
nearly as ubiquitous as the government in administrative
enforcement.
C. The Role of Private Parties in Administrative Enforcement
Private parties play an underappreciated role in administrative
enforcement.111 To begin, parties can initiate enforcement actions in
many administrative schemes by filing a complaint. Twenty-five of the
administrative courts listed in Appendix A hear cases in which private
parties have a right to file complaints concerning certain regulatory
violations.112 Like complaints filed in federal court, these
administrative complaints trigger a process that may ultimately lead
to an evidentiary hearing in which the agency adjudicates the claims
in the complaint. Unlike federal court, however, where the road to
trial follows a well-trodden path laid out in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,113 the road to an evidentiary hearing in administrative
enforcement may take several different paths.
Twenty-two administrative courts hear claims arising from
private complaints after some kind of investigation required by the

4 (2018). Similarly, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issues a charge under
the Fair Housing Act when it determines that reasonable cause exists to believe a violation has
occurred. 24 C.F.R. §§ 103.15, 103.400 (2018). “An aggrieved person is not a party but may file a
motion to intervene.” 24 C.F.R. § 180.310 (2018).
d in court).”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the
conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or an officer thereof is a party, or is
interested, and securing evidence therefore, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice,
under the direction of the Attorney General.”). Professors Herz and Devins suggest that agencies
with access to administrative forums and without independent litigating authority in federal
court will tilt their enforcement programs to the administrative tribunal in order to avoid relying
upon the DOJ. Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on
Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1369–71 (2000). This raises interesting questions
about how the DOJ—a generalist enforcer—might impact an agency’s enforcement scheme. See
Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113, 2115–16 (2015) (challenging the
claim that specialization is always superior to general enforcement expertise).
110. See supra notes 13 & 109.
111. See supra notes 14–21 and accompanying text.
112. See infra Appendix A, col. C.
113. Although, most cases brought in federal court now settle somewhere along the way.
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agency’s regulations.114 Others conduct investigations without any
regulatory requirement. These investigations serve different functions
depending on the type of claim. In some cases, the agency acts as a
gatekeeper, deciding whether the private party is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing, with or without the agency’s participation.115 In
others, the agency uses the investigation to decide whether the agency
should file a formal complaint and pursue an enforcement action.116 It
may be in the agency’s discretion whether to pursue the complaint,
even if it finds a regulatory violation,117 or the agency may be required
to pursue an enforcement action if it finds reason to believe the
complaint has merit.118
Moreover, twenty-five administrative courts hear claims in
which regulatory beneficiaries or other private parties besides the
respondents may participate in the enforcement action.119 Although
the specific procedural rights of parties vary by administrative
scheme, they may include the ability to submit briefs and evidence,
call and examine witnesses, participate in oral arguments, appeal
administrative decisions to a higher authority in the agency, and
114. See infra Appendix A, col. D; see also examples cited supra note 106.
115. For example, the Department of Energy may dismiss whistleblower complaints for lack
of jurisdiction or other good cause as defined in the regulations. 10 C.F.R. § 708.17 (2018).
Otherwise, if the agency is unable to resolve the matter informally, the complainant may request
an evidentiary hearing conducted by the Office of Hearings and Appeals. 10 C.F.R. § 708.21
(2018); see also examples cited supra note 107.
116. This is a common design. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. §§ 103.15, 103.400 (2018) (prescribing that
the Department of Housing and Urban Development should issue a charge under the Fair
Housing Act when it determines that reasonable cause exists to believe a violation has occurred);
29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (2018) (“After a charge has been filed, if it appears to the [National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”)] Regional Director that formal proceedings may be instituted, the
Director will issue and serve on all parties a formal complaint in the Board’s name . . . .”); 29
C.F.R. § 2700.40 (2018) (prescribing that the Secretary of Labor shall file a complaint under the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act if she determines after investigating a complaint that a
violation has occurred).
117. See, e.g., FED. ELECTION COMM’N, GUIDEBOOK FOR COMPLAINANTS AND RESPONDENTS
ON THE FEC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 12 (May 2012), https://transition.fec.gov/em/respondent_
guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ54-UB8P]:
Pursuant to an exercise of its prosecutorial discretion, the Commission may dismiss a
matter when, in the opinion of at least four Commissioners, the matter does not merit
further use of Commission resources. The Commission may take into account factors
such as the small dollar amount at issue, the insignificance of the alleged violation,
the vagueness or weakness of the evidence, or the merits of the response.
118. See, e.g., Investigate Charges, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/whatwe-do/investigate-charges (last visited Sept. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/XS32-ZYMF] (describing
how the NLRB pursues meritorious complaints when it is unable to facilitate a settlement
between the parties).
119. See infra Appendix A, col. E; see also, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2200.20 (2018) (granting
employees, their representatives, and employers party status in disputes over abatement periods
set by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) for employers).
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ultimately seek judicial review.120 Finally, fifteen administrative
courts hear claims in which private parties may pursue enforcement
actions with or without the agency’s participation.121 Such cases most
closely resemble private enforcement in federal court.
Thus, administrative enforcement is often hybrid in nature,
falling somewhere on a continuum between public and private
enforcement. At either end are administrative schemes virtually
indistinguishable from public or private enforcement in federal court.
But much agency adjudication falls somewhere in between, with
attributes of both. At the public end, an agency may have sole
discretion whether to pursue an enforcement action or even respond to
a public complaint.122 At the private end, private parties may have the
authority to pursue enforcement actions with or without the agency.123
Between these ends, the agency may generally retain control over
whether to institute enforcement actions but be required to institute
such actions when it finds reason to believe a violation has occurred.124
Alternatively, private parties may be permitted to intervene in agency
enforcement actions to protect their interests.125 Table 1 lists some
attributes of public and private enforcement found in the
administrative schemes included in Appendix A.

120. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 702 (2012).
121. See infra Appendix A, col. F. For example, the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review
Board hears claims by miners arising from black lung disease, but the Secretary of Labor may
participate in the cases. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 725.360 (2018). It is common for administrative
schemes to allow private parties to pursue whistleblower complaints even when the agency
otherwise has primary enforcement responsibility.
122. See, e.g., infra Appendix A (FTC).
123. See, e.g., infra Appendix A (DOL Benefits Review Board).
124. See, e.g., infra Appendix A (NLRB).
125. See, e.g., infra Appendix A (OSHRC).
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TABLE 1: ENFORCEMENT ATTRIBUTES
Attributes of Public
Enforcement

Attributes of Private
Enforcement

Agency reviews private complaints

Procedures for private complaints

Agency investigates complaints

Right to investigation

Agency attempts to settle

Right to decision on complaint

Agency acts as gatekeeper to private action

Right to evidentiary hearing

Agency may join private actions

Right to appeal agency decision

Agency has nonexclusive right of action

Agency action on complaint
nondiscretionary

Agency has exclusive public right of action

Private parties may join public actions

Public enforcement is discretionary

Nonexclusive private right of action
Exclusive private right of action

Table 2 illustrates where some administrative schemes fall on
the public-private enforcement continuum based on their design.
TABLE 2: CONTINUUM OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT126
Public

↑

Agency
SEC
FTC

NLRB

↓
Private

Public Enforcement
Exclusive, independent, and
discretionary public
enforcement
Exclusive and discretionary
public enforcement
Agency investigates and
attempts to settle private
complaints;
exclusive public right of action

STB

Nonexclusive public right of
action (rarely used)

DOL,
BRB

Agency may intervene

Private Enforcement

Procedures for private
complaints;
certain parties may
intervene in certain cases
Agency action on
meritorious complaint is
nondiscretionary;
complaints may be
withdrawn;
certain parties may
participate in public
enforcement
Nonexclusive private right
of action (largely private
enforcement)
Exclusive private right of
action (largely private
enforcement)

126. For a full list of agencies and their rules of practice and procedure, see infra
Appendix A.
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To be sure, some attributes of private enforcement listed in
Table 1 may seem too trivial, without more, to justify characterizing
the administrative scheme as anything other than public enforcement.
The right to file a complaint with an agency is not all that different
from the ability of a citizen to report a violation of law to a public
prosecutor. The ability to trigger an agency investigation provides
citizens with more leverage, but not much. Unless private parties have
the right to a reasoned decision on their complaint by an independent
adjudicator based on the record of an evidentiary hearing, they are
highly dependent on public enforcers for remedies. Courts generally
grant agencies substantial discretion whether to investigate a charge
or file a complaint based on that charge.127
Nevertheless, even very limited procedural rights for private
parties assist agencies in their pursuit of public goals consistent with
theories of private enforcement. As discussed more fully in Part III, an
institutionalized process for reviewing complaints, particularly if it
triggers an investigation and a written decision by the agency,
augments the capacity of public enforcers to monitor the regulatory
landscape and highlights violations that may have escaped their
attention. Although such rights, without more, may not ultimately
provide a remedy if the agency is adamantly opposed to enforcement,
agencies do not always seek to underenforce. When agencies are
committed to their missions, information from private parties is vital
to the agency’s enforcement arm.128
The right to file a complaint or pursue an action does not
necessarily mean parties use it, of course. Our understanding of
administrative enforcement would certainly benefit from better
tracking of cases by party. Nevertheless, the availability of remedies
creates incentives for private parties to pursue them. In addition, the
available data confirms that both agencies and private parties do use
these procedural rights.129 Thus, private parties are deeply embedded
in agency adjudication.
127. See Barkow, supra note 12, at 1132 (“Courts tend to steer clear of second-guessing an
agency’s selection of which actors to target and which to ignore. The judiciary takes a similarly
hands-off approach to reviewing an agency’s broader plans for how it will proceed with
enforcement.”); Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 901 (2009)
(“[A]n agency has a great deal of discretion about which violators it will pursue.”).
128. See infra notes 176–177 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Velikonj, supra note 100, at 923, tbl.1 (reporting 610 public enforcement
actions in 2014); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE: COMPLAINTS BY THE
NUMBERS (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201503_cfpb_
complaints-by-the-numbers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/37W5-8B5M]
[hereinafter
CONSUMER
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III. THE FUNCTION OF HYBRID ENFORCEMENT IN AGENCY
ADJUDICATION
The literature comparing public and private enforcement has
largely ignored administrative enforcement.130 Thus, there has been
no attempt to theorize the function of hybrid enforcement in
administrative courts. This Part begins to fill this gap by examining
how different attributes of public and private enforcement further the
goals of agency adjudication while mitigating some of its risks.131
As discussed more fully in the following Sections, agency
adjudication seeks to achieve three main goals: greater legal access to
remedies for private parties;132 more accurate, expeditious, and
consistent decisions informed by specialized expertise;133 and
increased coherence and political accountability in public policy.134 Yet
the pursuit of these goals raises new concerns. Expanding legal access
for regulatory beneficiaries through informal and less costly
procedures puts pressure on the accuracy and legitimacy of agency
decisions.135 Increasing the specialization and expertise of adjudicators
increases the danger of narrow-minded decisions, agency capture, and
backlogs caused by caseload volatility.136 The coordination of
adjudication, enforcement, and rulemaking by a political appointee
may compromise the rights of parties to individualized decisions and
result in over- or underdeterrence, with political swings from

RESPONSE] (reporting more than 558,800 consumer complaints filed with the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) during its first three and a half years); U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 100 (reporting 7,074 private actions in
approximately
five
years);
Board
Decisions
Issued,
NAT’L
LAB.
REL.
BD.,
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/decisions/board-decisions-issued (last visited
Sept. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T82R-6MVQ] (reporting several hundred cases decided each
year triggered by private complaints).
130. See supra notes 14–21 and accompanying text.
131. Part III examines the goals that have been offered as justification for the use of agencies
rather than courts to adjudicate certain disputes. There may also be other, less normatively
attractive reasons why Congress delegates decisions to agencies. See, e.g., Jed Handelsman
Shugerman, The Dependent Origins of Independent Agencies: The Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Tenure of Office Act, and the Rise of Modern Campaign Finance, 31 J.L. & POL.
139, 144 (2015) (arguing that the desire to obtain campaign contributions from industry
participants contributed to the political support for the creation of the ICC “rather than reliance
on the courts for enforcement”).
132. See infra Section III.A.
133. See infra Section III.B.
134. See infra Section III.C.
135. See infra Section III.A.
136. See infra Section III.B.
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administration to administration.137 Hybrid enforcement can further
the goals of adjudication while mitigating some of its risks.
A. Enhancing Access to Justice
Agency adjudication seeks to enhance access to justice by
providing a more informal and less expensive forum than federal court
for the adjudication of disputes that impact private parties.138 When
Congress creates administrative courts for private parties, it almost
always cites challenges faced by regulatory beneficiaries in federal
court.139 Furthering legal access is consistent with one of the
normative goals of the administrative process generally—greater
public participation in government policymaking.140
Expanding legal access through more informal and less costly
procedures, however, puts pressure on the accuracy and legitimacy of
agency decisions. This raises due process concerns when there is a
private party on the other side of the “v.” Hybrid enforcement in
administrative courts helps address these concerns and allows
agencies to protect the due process interests of private respondents
while enhancing access to legal remedies for regulatory beneficiaries.
1. A More Informal and Less Expensive Forum
Agencies offer a more informal and potentially more
expeditious forum for the resolution of claims than federal court. The
137. See infra Section III.C.
138. Legal access is particularly important to the adjudication of government benefits, which
is often designed to be particularly protective of potential beneficiaries. See, e.g., Veterans’
Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. 100-687, § 3007, 102 Stat. 4105, 4107 (1988) (instructing the
Veterans’ Administration (now the Department of Veterans Affairs) to give claimants “the
benefit of the doubt” when “there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence
regarding the merits of an issue”); Frank S. Bloch et al., Developing a Full and Fair Evidentiary
Record in a Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security Disability
Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 6 n.17 (2003) (noting resistance to providing the
government with a legal representative or closing the evidentiary record in social security
disability proceedings). But informal procedures are also helpful to private parties that seek to
pursue enforcement claims in administrative courts. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986) (noting Congress’s goal in creating the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission to provide “an inexpensive and expeditious alternative forum” to
federal court); SKOWRONEK, supra note 91, at 146 (reporting that congressional advocates of a
strong ICC claimed “it would be able to arbitrate disputes quickly and at low cost”).
139. See supra Section II.A.
140. See, e.g., STEVE P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008) (arguing that regulatory agencies are more accessible to
less powerful groups than legislatures); Stewart, supra note 60, at 1748–55 (describing the
expansion of participation rights pushed by the courts).
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APA imposes few procedural requirements on adjudication not subject
to the requirements of Section 554.141 But even formal adjudication
under the APA does not include the full panoply of evidentiary tools
regularly used in federal court. Prehearing discovery is usually quite
limited, the Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are rarely controlling (albeit often invoked), and the use of
juries is unknown.142 Many agency procedures impose strict timelines,
limit discovery, and provide for paper rather than in-person
hearings.143
Due process limits the informality of adjudication when it
might deprive individuals of property or liberty interests.144
Nevertheless, although the process due varies given the issues and
interests at stake, no court has held that due process requires agency
adjudication to include all the procedures of a civil action in federal
court.145 Absent due process constraints, agencies typically enjoy broad
discretion to tailor their procedures to the particular cases they
hear.146 The Supreme Court has reasoned that agencies “should be
free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of
inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous
duties.”147

141. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. The LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655 (1990) (“[T]he minimal
requirements for [informal adjudication] are set forth in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 555.”); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail that Wags the Dog: Ex Post and Ex Ante Constraints on
Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1057, 1059–60 (2004) (“[T]he APA does not provide
any specific and dedicated procedural requirements applicable to informal adjudications, and
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Vermont
Yankee) effectively precludes reviewing courts from imposing procedures on federal
administrative agencies.”).
142. Even formal adjudications conducted by the SEC with significant sums at stake are not
bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence.
143. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 99, 242–43 (describing procedures for challenging patents
in the USPTO).
144. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975) (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
579 (1973)) (holding that due process “applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as
well as to courts”).
145. Krotoszynski, supra note 141, at 1061–62 (“Procedural due process requires, at a
minimum, notice, a hearing with some sort of opportunity to be heard, and the communication of
a decision.”); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976) (establishing how courts
should determine how much process is due before the government deprives an individual of
property or liberty); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279
(1975) (reasoning that “if an agency chooses to go further than is constitutionally demanded with
respect to one [element of a fair hearing], this may afford good reason for diminishing or even
eliminating another”).
146. Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 1653.
147. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940); see also Adoption of
Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 40,259, 40,260 (June 21, 2016) (“Federal agencies often enjoy
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Given their relative informality, administrative proceedings
are generally less costly and more expeditious forums for relief than
federal court.148 To be sure, some agency adjudication looks
remarkably similar to its judicial counterpart.149 Nevertheless, when
direct comparisons can be made, agency proceedings tend to be shorter
and more streamlined than civil litigation.150 Congress can also reduce
the costs of enforcement actions by imposing caps on attorney’s fees or
prohibiting legal representation for either the private party or the
government.151
2. Threats of Informality to Accuracy and Legitimacy
Streamlining agency procedures may impede the ability of
parties to present their cases, increase the risk of errors by
decisionmakers, and undermine the legitimacy of agency

broad discretion . . . to craft procedures they deem ‘necessary and appropriate’ to adjudicate the
cases and claims that come before them.”).
148. Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of the
Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 504 (2003).
149. See, e.g., Joseph P. Sirbak II, Procedures for Litigating SOX Whistleblower Complaints,
2016 WL 3476536, at *4 (2016) (describing the discovery tools in whistleblower disputes, which
permit “discovery . . . regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to a party’s claim or
defense”). To be sure, significant delays in agency adjudication, particularly in large benefits
programs, are notorious and persistent. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 27, at 1381 (“Agency
delays in decisionmaking and action have been widely acknowledged as a fundamental
impediment to the effective functioning of federal agencies . . . .”); Michael Sant’Ambrogio &
Adam Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1994–97 (2012)
(suggesting that parties be “able to aggregate their claims before” agencies to make adjudication
more efficient). But these delays are usually due to the time spent waiting for adjudication,
rather than the time it takes to adjudicate the claims. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki,
644 F.3d 845, 877–78 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing delays in veterans programs); Erik Eckholm,
Disability Claims Last Longer as Backload Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A1 (citing fivehundred-day waiting periods for social security disability claims).
150. When comparing administrative and judicial resolution of the same kind of enforcement
action, SEC Director of Enforcement Andrew Ceresney noted:
[A]dministrative actions produce prompt decisions. An ALJ normally has 300 days
from when a matter is instituted to issue an initial decision. That deadline can be
extended in certain cases, but the hearings are still held promptly. For cases we file in
district court, we can often go 300 days and still be just at the motion to dismiss stage
or part of the way through discovery, with any trial still far down the road.
Andrew Ceresney, Dir., SEC Div. of Enf’t, Remarks to the Am. Bar Ass’n’s Bus. Law Section Fall
Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543515297
[https://perma.cc/CRL5-7XCE].
151. Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the
VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1716 (2015) (noting the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program’s (“NVICP”) limits on payments to counsel resulting in fourteen percent of benefits
being paid to counsel as compared to fifty percent in the tort liability system).
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proceedings.152 For example, the Vaccine Court was originally
envisioned as being informal enough for injured parties to file their
own claims for vaccine-related injuries without the assistance of
counsel, but it quickly became apparent that representation by
experienced counsel was necessary for claimants to succeed.153
More often, however, complaints come from respondents on the
other side of the “v.” While agency adjudication of government benefits
is often structured to be especially solicitous of beneficiaries asserting
claims against the government,154 regulatory enforcement cases
involve nongovernmental respondents. Thus, the agency must grapple
not only with legal access for statutory beneficiaries but also with
concerns over accuracy and legitimacy on the part of private
respondents. Whereas due process is irrelevant to the procedural
protections afforded to government respondents in benefits cases, it
requires protections for private respondents in enforcement cases.
Put differently, we do not generally worry about providing
public enforcers with greater access to an adjudicatory forum.
Congress can provide them with the necessary resources to bring
enforcement actions in federal court. Thus, advocates (and critics) of
agency adjudication speak not in terms of informality and
expeditiousness of administrative enforcement but in terms of its
efficiency—i.e., the efficiency of prosecuting enforcement actions in an
agency rather than a court.155 This justification is generally not
152. See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 138, at 55 (noting problems in the development of the record
in social security disability proceedings due to their informality); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers
for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 107 (1995) (“To be accepted as courts, tribunals—
whether specialized or generalist—must look and act like courts.”).
153. Engstrom, supra note 151, at 1713 (quoting Representative Patsy Mink).
154. For example, the government is not represented as a party in disputes over social
security disability benefits. See FRANK BLOCH, JEFFREY LUBBERS & PAUL VERKUIL, INTRODUCING
NONADVERSARIAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES TO IMPROVE THE RECORD FOR DECISION IN
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATIONS 3 (2003), https://www.ssab.gov/Portals/0/our_work/
reports to the board/RTB-Bloch-Lubbers-Verkuil_Nonadversarial_Representatives_2003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6NE6-JQQK] (“[Social Security Administration (“SSA”)] hearings are one of the
few such proceedings where the agency is, as a rule, unrepresented and where the record is left
open throughout the administrative appeals process to ensure the claimant’s file is complete.”);
see also Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321–22 (1985) (discussing
Congress’s decision to avoid the use of lawyers in the adjudication of veterans benefits out of a
desire to create a low-cost forum for veterans).
155. See, e.g., Jason D. Nichols, Towards Reviving the Efficacy of Administrative Compliance
Orders: Balancing Due Process Concerns and the Need for Enforcement Flexibility in
Environmental Law, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 193, 222–23 (2005) (noting how “pre-enforcement
adjudication within the agency furthers efficiency interests and avoids civil litigation costs”);
Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 294
(1978) (noting that fairness and satisfaction for respondents may be more important than
efficiency when an agency imposes sanctions).
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considered as compelling as helping private parties advance claims
that would be difficult to pursue in federal court. Moreover, less
formal and expedited proceedings have limited upside for respondents
in enforcement actions, particularly if the stakes are high and the
respondents are well resourced.156 They would generally prefer the full
panoply of procedural protections available in federal court. Not
surprisingly, then, the efficiency rationale is the bête noire of critics of
agency adjudication of public enforcement actions.157
Agencies have struggled over process protections for
respondents in public enforcement actions for many years. For
example, beginning in the 1960s, the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) began adopting many of the procedures of federal litigation in
its own proceedings in response to the concerns expressed by
respondents over the legitimacy of the proceedings.158 More recently,
respondents in Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
enforcement actions have complained about the compressed timeline
and limited discovery available in cases heard by SEC ALJs. The SEC
has responded to these complaints by slowing down the pace of the
proceedings and affording respondents more discovery tools borrowed
from federal court.159 These experiences suggest that administrative
enforcement schemes are unlikely to eliminate adversarialism.160
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, enhancing legal access
in agency proceedings requires a careful balancing of the desire for an
informal and expeditious forum and the need for fair and accurate
decisionmaking.161

156. There may be benefits to injured persons not party to the proceedings, however.
157. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 3, at 274–75 (criticizing the necessity and efficiency
justifications).
158. D. Bruce Hoffman & M. Sean Royall, Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Past,
Present, and Future, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 319, 321 (2003).
159. Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 50 Fed. Reg. 60,091 (Oct. 24, 2015).
In addition to relaxing certain deadlines, the SEC proposed permitting depositions and
subpoenas under certain conditions.
160. THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 39 (2002) (noting creeping adversarialism in workers’
compensation systems); Elinor P. Schroeder, Legislative and Judicial Responses to the
Inadequacy of Compensation for Occupational Diseases, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1986,
at 151, 157–58 (noting that adjudication of workers’ compensation claims for occupational
diseases has “taken on many of the trappings of common law litigation—retention of lawyers,
delays, cost, and compromise”—unlike most accident claims).
161. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”); Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due
Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1309 (2012) (arguing that “adapting the demands of due process
to new facts and circumstances is faithful to constitutional doctrine and necessary to ensure that
existing procedures continue to provide due process of law”).
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3. Using Hybrid Enforcement to Enhance Legal Access While
Protecting Legitimacy
Hybrid enforcement in agency adjudication addresses the
tension between enhancing legal access and maintaining the
legitimacy of adjudicatory decisions. Procedural rights to file
complaints with an agency, often without the same formalities
required of pleadings in federal court, improve the ability of private
parties to bring regulatory violations to the agency’s attention. Agency
review, investigation of complaints, and assistance in pursuing
enforcement actions further enhance access to regulatory benefits. Of
course, a private right to a decision on a complaint based on the record
of an evidentiary hearing may provide the surest access to relief. But
this is only true if the party has the resources to pursue such a
complaint on its own. If not, giving a public enforcer responsibility for
pursuing private complaints offers beneficiaries a valuable “assist” in
enforcing their claims.
At the same time, placing primary responsibility for
enforcement on public officials allows administrative courts to provide
process protections for respondents without impeding access to justice
by beneficiaries. Congress can provide agencies with the resources
they need to prosecute cases in administrative courts that use
judicialized procedures to ensure the legitimacy of their decisions. The
agency can still give beneficiaries a voice in regulatory enforcement by
pursuing their complaints and allowing private parties to intervene or
otherwise participate in public actions. But the beneficiaries
themselves do not need to navigate judicialized procedures designed to
protect respondents.
Thus, public enforcement allows agencies to maintain due
process protections for private respondents while facilitating access for
private beneficiaries. In this way, hybrid enforcement enhances the
legitimacy of agency adjudication.
B. Decisionmaking Informed by Specialized Expertise
One of the most commonly cited reasons for delegating
decisions to agencies rather than courts is the need for specialized
expertise.162 Hybrid enforcement furthers this goal by encouraging
162. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State,
89 GEO. L.J. 97, 135 (2000) (“[A] commonly cited and crucial reason for the delegation to agencies
is the desire to have decisions made by public officials with expertise and extensive informationgathering capabilities.”).
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private parties to supplement the information resources of federal
agencies. At the same time, the use of specialized decisionmakers
creates new risks: agency “decision mills,” caseload volatility causing
backlogs, and “agency capture” by regulated industries. Hybrid
enforcement mitigates the risks of decision mills and agency capture
by diversifying enforcement inputs, while public control over
enforcement reduces caseload volatility by filtering cases docketed for
hearings.
1. Deploying Agency Expertise in Adjudication
Agencies are generally able to hire personnel with specialized
expertise.163 Advocates of agency expertise claim that specialization
enables decisionmakers to make decisions more quickly because they
need less time to familiarize themselves with complex issues or
obscure areas of regulation.164 In addition, specialization enables more
accurate decisionmaking because the adjudicator is better able to
assess technical evidence and the relative merits of similar, yet
distinct claims.165
Despite the intuitive appeal of these claims, there is scant
quantitative empirical evidence available to either prove or disprove
them.166 The significant delays experienced in several adjudicatory
programs167 and persistent inconsistencies in agency decisions168
163. Although the ability of agencies to deploy their expertise is somewhat different in
adjudication than rulemaking, the need for expert decisionmakers remains an important
justification of agency adjudication. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (“[P]atent judges shall be
persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability . . . .”).
164. See LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 3233 (2011) (discussing perceived
efficiency advantages); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Courts: Specialists
Versus Generalists, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 788, 794 (2013):
The ability early on to spot a gap in either a party’s economic reasoning or its factual
allegations is surely improved by frequent exposure to recurring economic issues. The
learning curve may be fairly steep, even for antitrust cases, but the generalist judge
who sees one antitrust case every year or two would surely be slower to progress down
that curve than would the judge who sees such cases weekly.
165. See Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 164, at 797–98.
166. See Engstrom, supra note 151, at 1640.
167. See, e.g., Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 1675–76.
168. See, e.g., JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM
ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 6 (2009) (citing wide disparities in the outcomes of
similar asylum applications); Engstrom, supra note 151, at 1677 (citing DIVISION OF VACCINE
INJURY COMPENSATION, NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLAN,
app. H at 25 (2006)) (noting inconsistencies in the Vaccine Court decisions); James D. Ridgway,
Barton F. Stichman & Rory E. Riley, “Not Reasonably Debatable”: The Problems with SingleJudge Decisions by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2016)
(surveying inconsistencies in decisions by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims). But see
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suggest a healthy dose of skepticism, particularly in agencies with
large caseloads. Moreover, the value of expertise and specialization
will vary with the complexity of the evidence relevant to the claims
heard by administrative courts. When the issues are not particularly
difficult, specialization may not add much in the way of more accurate
decisionmaking.169 By contrast, when cases involve technical issues,
specialized knowledge, and complex areas of regulation, experienced
decisionmakers should be able to reach accurate decisions more
quickly than generalist judges.
The informational advantage of agencies over courts and
legislators is at its greatest in rulemaking, where agencies have
numerous tools and few limits on their ability to obtain the expertise
and information they need. The situation is somewhat different for
adjudication. First, the ALJs who make many decisions may initially
have little specialized knowledge or experience in the area in which
they adjudicate due to the hiring criteria used by the Office of
Personnel Management (“OPM”).170 Second, once hired, prohibitions
on ex parte communications and separation of functions limit whom
many administrative judges may and may not consult.171 If agencies
are not required to use an ALJ, they may require their adjudicators to
have certain experience or expertise.172 But it is not clear how many
agencies do so. In addition, the agency’s organic statute or its own
regulations may further limit the expertise available to non–Article III
adjudicators, even when they are not subject to the prohibitions
Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to
Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 415–16 (2007) (remarking that “[t]here are times when we
simply have to learn to live with unequal justice because the alternatives are worse” and citing
the costs of eroding “decisional independence” in particular).
169. Cass Sunstein calls “the choice of an administrative law judge to award or withhold
disability benefits under the standards set out by the Social Security Act” a “legalistic decision”
that could just as easily be decided by “state or federal judges.” Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 445 (1987).
170. See Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication
Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1009 (2004)
(“The process allows little room for judgment and discretion, and affords agencies virtually no
choice in which ALJs to hire. It does not take account of whether a new ALJ has specialized
experience in the regulatory or beneficiary scheme administered by the agency.”). This is likely
to change, however, in the wake of Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018) (holding that ALJs
are officers of the United States who must be appointed under the Appointments Clause by the
president or the “Heads of Departments”), and the Executive Order Excepting Administrative
Law Judges from the Competitive Service, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 10, 2018) (excepting ALJs
from the competitive hiring rules and examinations of the OPM).
171. See supra note 82 (discussing rules regarding ex parte communications and separation
of functions applicable to ALJs and AJs).
172. See Emily S. Bremer, Designing the Decider, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 79
(describing three examples of such employment requirements).
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applicable to ALJs under the APA.173 Protecting the independence and
neutrality of administrative judges is essential to ensuring the
legitimacy of agency adjudication in light of its overt policymaking
goals. But it also limits the ability of agencies to apply their
institutional knowledge most efficiently.
Nevertheless, many administrative judges become highly
experienced in their regulatory areas over time. Unlike courts, which
have a broad range of cases on their dockets, agency adjudicators
typically hear very similar cases day after day. As Andrew Ceresney,
the former director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, described it,
[A]dministrative proceedings have the benefit of specialized factfinders. The ALJs are
focused on hearing and deciding securities cases, year after year. They develop expert
knowledge of the securities laws, and the types of entities, instruments, and practices
that frequently appear in our cases. Many of our cases involve somewhat technical
provisions of the securities laws, and ALJs become knowledgeable about these
provisions.174

Moreover, the agency heads typically authorized to make final agency
decisions usually have access to all the agency’s staff, much like in
rulemaking.175 Thus, compared to most federal judges, agency
decisionmakers tend to possess greater familiarity with the relevant
facts, issues, and law in the narrower range of cases they hear.
2. Bolstering Agency Expertise Through Hybrid Enforcement
Hybrid enforcement bolsters the information resources of
agency adjudication. First, if the agency is a party to the dispute, it
can provide the administrative judge with specialized expertise
developed through its experience in the regulatory area. As repeat
players, public enforcers should be skilled at presenting the agency’s
knowledge and expertise in their cases.
Second, the participation of private parties in enforcement
supplements the information resources of the agency by bringing their
situated knowledge of violations to the attention of regulators.176
Indeed, private parties may supplement public enforcement efforts

173. See, e.g., Fisk & Malamud, supra note 96, at 2048 (noting a statutory limit on the
NLRB’s adjudicative staff’s ability to employ the economic analysis of the Board’s Division of
Economic Research).
174. Ceresney, supra note 150.
175. The APA does not place the same limits on internal communications involving the
head(s) of the agency as it does on the initial agency adjudicators, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012),
although restrictions on ex parte communications with interested parties outside the agency still
apply, 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (2012).
176. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1290; Thompson, supra note 30, at 192.
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more effectively in agencies than in courts. Not only does private
enforcement uncover violations that may have escaped a public
enforcer’s attention, as in federal court, it also broadens and deepens
the knowledge and expertise of public officials responsible for
coordinating enforcement, adjudication, and rulemaking. Thus, the
information derived from private complaints can be used by the
agency not only in its own enforcement actions but also in rulemaking
and other regulatory activities. For example, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) “uses consumer complaints to inform its
work in making prices and risks clearer, protecting consumers of
financial products and services, and encouraging financial markets to
operate fairly and competitively . . . [and] its thinking on credit cards,
mortgages, bank products and services, vehicle and consumer loans,
and private student loans.”177
Thus, hybrid enforcement in administrative courts maximizes
the information resources and expertise brought to bear in regulatory
enforcement actions and enriches the expertise of the agency more
generally.
3. The Risks of Specialized Decisionmakers
As agencies leverage their expertise, however, specialized
decisionmakers create risks less present in generalist courts. These
include the risk of “decision mills” in which adjudicators prejudge
cases based on past experience and the need to process large numbers
of claims, the risk of “agency capture” by regulated industries that
repeatedly appear before the agency, and the risk of recurring
backlogs caused by caseload volatility.
a. Decision Mills
Increased specialization creates a danger that agency
adjudicators repeatedly presiding over the same types of cases and
claims will fall victim to tunnel vision.178 This can occur both at the

177. Eric J. Mogilnicki & Melissa S. Malpass, The First Year of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: An Overview, 68 BUS. LAW. 557, 568 (2013) (quoting CONSUMER RESPONSE,
supra note 129).
178. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 11 (1993) (describing the phenomenon of tunnel vision); Stephanie Russell-Kraft,
Rakoff Hopes SEC Will “Think Twice” About Using Admin Court, LAW360 (Mar. 3, 2015),
https://www.law360.com/newyork/articles/627028
[https://perma.cc/PW5F-QFPQ]
(reporting
Judge Rakoff’s remarks on agency tunnel vision at a panel hosted by the New York City Bar
Association). Justice Stephen Breyer describes the problem as the “single-minded pursuit of a
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level of individual employees—such as adjudicators, who focus on one
narrow task—and of the agency as a whole, which focuses on one
category of problems. As the old adage puts it, “When you’re a
hammer, everything looks like a nail.” Agency adjudicators may begin
to make assumptions about the merits of individual claims based on
the cases they typically hear, become overly sympathetic to legal
interpretations that further their core mission without regard to
countervailing concerns, and impose harsher penalties without regard
to equitable considerations.179 Alternatively, they may become so jaded
that they have a hard time seeing meritorious cases. Either way, the
danger is that the agency becomes a decision mill.
Agencies have several tools to address the risk of decision
mills. First, most agencies employ multiple levels of review to check
errors.180 Second, agencies sometimes sort cases based on whether
they are routine, raise novel questions, or are likely to impact a large
number of people. They may dispose of routine cases using a single
adjudicator, nonprecedential decisions, or summary review, while
funneling more complex cases to multijudge panels, more rigorous
review, and precedential decisions to guide similar cases in the
future.181
Nevertheless, multiple layers of review, particularly when
combined with subsequent judicial review, may delay final resolution
of the matter, thus undermining the goal of access to justice. In
addition, early sorting of cases may exacerbate tunnel vision by
increasing the likelihood of adjudicators prejudging the merits of
cases. Thus, the problem of decision mills is not always easy to solve.
b. Agency Capture
Specialized decisionmakers may also start to favor the industry
they are meant to regulate. If adjudicators are chosen for their
experience and expertise, there is a good chance they gained that

single goal too far, to the point where it brings about more harm than good.” BREYER, supra, at
11.
179. See David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155 (2016)
(arguing the SEC has fallen prey to these issues).
180. See Russell L. Weaver, Appellate Review in Executive Departments and Agencies, 48
ADMIN. L. REV. 251, 253–70 (1996) (examining the appellate structures used in various federal
agencies).
181. For example, “routine” cases brought in front of the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation Appeals Board and the Veterans Court are decided by individual Board members or
Veteran Court judges, whereas novel or significant matters that impact a large number of
parties are decided by three-judge panels. See 29 C.F.R. § 4003.61 (2018).
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experience working for regulated parties, possibly even appearing
before the agency in administrative proceedings. Thus, they may come
to the agency with preconceived notions about how cases should be
resolved.
There is a long literature on agency capture and the danger is
not peculiar to adjudication.182 In some ways, ALJs are less
susceptible to regulatory capture than other agency officials. ALJs
have the kind of job protections and long-term tenure that are
incompatible with the economic theory of agency capture.183 In
addition, they are probably less susceptible to the more subtle version
of the theory, which posits that agencies are systematically biased
toward regulated entities because they need good relationships with
industry to get information.184 ALJs are not dependent on industry in
this way, even when they come from industry before joining the
agency.
Still, critics of specialized courts argue they are susceptible to
capture by repeat players in administrative proceedings, particularly
if those parties are cohesive, well-resourced, and unopposed by
countervailing interest groups.185 The same concerns may be relevant
to administrative judges who preside over similar cases involving
repeat players day after day. Unlike legislative courts, however,
administrative agencies are supervised by political appointees who
review the initial adjudicators’ decisions.186 Thus, it seems more likely
that agency adjudicators will tack toward agency leadership than
182. The concept of agency capture first appeared in the public choice literature arguing that
the political process is driven by economic rather than ideological interests. See, e.g., George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971). For a
classic study of capture in four agencies, see PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL
REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981). See also Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory
Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167
(1990) (reviewing agency capture literature); Stewart, supra note 60, at 1685 & nn.75–76.
183. The primary mechanism of capture traditionally has been assumed to be the prospect of
future employment in the regulated industry. See QUIRK, supra note 182, at 143–74.
184. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 60, at 1684–87 (describing why agencies are predisposed
to favor interests of regulated industry).
185. See David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 72 (1975) (collecting claims of bias
against legislative and administrative courts); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (1989) (“Where adversaries are
imbalanced . . . judges may become more easily swayed by those who appear before them
frequently, and by the policy arguments that they hear most often.”); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza,
Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1456–57 (2012) (describing the
influence of industry and the patent bar in the creation of the Federal Circuit).
186. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article
III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, (1988) (discussing the tension between this reality and the demands
of Article III); Weaver, supra note 180, at 252.
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toward the regulated industry.187 If the agency leadership is
committed, they may be able to disrupt the capture of lower-level
decisionmakers, although agency heads sometimes have difficulty
controlling independent administrative judges.188 But if the agency
leadership itself comes from industry, they may only exacerbate
capture.
c. Caseload Volatility
Finally, specialization exposes administrative courts to acute
challenges with volatile caseloads. As Judge Richard Posner notes,
“[T]he federal appellate caseload as a whole changes less from year to
year than the components of that caseload.”189 Thus, even as dramatic
growth in appeals from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
stretched the capacity of the circuit courts, the reduction in other
components of their dockets offered some relief.190 Because agencies
are typically dealing with a specific subject area, however, they are at
greater risk of dramatic increases in their caseloads without any
compensating decrease.191 This inevitably creates delays and backlogs
as the agency scrambles to hire more adjudicators or find other ways
to streamline its decisionmaking process, none of which may be
realistic.192 Such delays and backlogs are worst when an agency is
adjudicating claims drawn from a large pool of potential beneficiaries
with changing demographics. But even agencies with smaller dockets
may experience this problem unless they are able to borrow
187. Of course, the agency leadership may in some cases come from the regulated industry.
See, e.g., Danielle Ivory & Robert Faturechi, The Deep Industry Ties of Trump’s Deregulation
Teams, N.Y. TIMES, (July 11, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2v6AHAb [https://perma.cc/7YPC-4RN7].
Section III.C addresses what this Article describes as “political capture,” which occurs when the
political branches seek to undermine an agency’s statutory mandate. The line between “political
capture” and “regulatory capture” is not always clear, but generally understood, the traditional
form of agency capture is driven by the structural relationship between an agency and its
regulated industry, while political capture is driven by the political appointees at the top of the
agency.
188. Social Security Administration ALJs are a well-known example of initial
decisionmakers that an agency has had difficulty controlling.
189. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 259–60
(1999).
190. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics
-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018 (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
M6MN-F9DK] (“BIA appeals accounted for 81 percent of administrative agency appeals and
constituted the largest category of administrative agency appeals filed in each circuit except the
DC Circuit.”).
191. See Engstrom, supra note 151, at 1689–90 (citing examples of volatile caseloads at the
Vaccine Court, Department of Veterans Affairs, and other specialized tribunals).
192. Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 164, at 805.
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adjudicators from other agencies. Thus, specialization may threaten
some of the expeditiousness sought by administrative courts.
4. Mitigating the Risks of Specialization Through
Hybrid Enforcement
Hybrid enforcement can mitigate some of the risks of
specialization. First, the involvement of both private parties and
agency officials in administrative proceedings exposes agencies to
multiple enforcement inputs. Agreements among public and private
enforcers may signal strong cases, while disagreements may
encourage adjudicators to scrutinize the facts of individual cases more
closely, thus disrupting decision mills.
Second, hybrid enforcement mitigates the risks of agency
capture. The right of private parties to file complaints in agency
proceedings, trigger investigations, and obtain reasoned decisions on
their claims ensures that regulatory beneficiaries are heard. The more
robust the private rights, the louder their voices. Moreover, when an
agency cozies up to a regulated industry, the shift will be more
transparent if the agency is required to give reasons for ruling against
claimants.193 These benefits of private enforcement will be at their
greatest when private parties are entitled to decisions based on the
record of an evidentiary hearing.
The bifurcated decisionmaking of agency adjudication also
reduces the risk of capture because administrative judges and political
appointees who make final agency decisions have different
perspectives and relationships to the regulatory and political
environments. It should be more difficult for industry to capture both
sets of decisionmakers. Differences between them in deciding cases
will also make capture more transparent if each decisionmaker must
issue reasoned decisions on the record.
Finally, public enforcement can help agencies control caseload
volatility.194 Agency investigations and mediation efforts help resolve
cases before they proceed to evidentiary hearings. If the agency
possesses exclusive authority to pursue complaints or acts as
gatekeeper to private complaints, it need only advance enforcement
193. See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1281
(2009) (“[R]eason-giving promotes accountability by facilitating transparency in government.”).
194. Jonathan B. Rosenblum, A New Look at the General Counsel’s Unreviewable Discretion
Not to Issue a Complaint Under the NLRA, 86 YALE L.J. 1349, 1357 & n.32 (1977) (“Only [the
NLRB’s] centralized control over enforcement proceedings could prevent the agency from being
inundated with routine work and free it to stake out the major parameters of the Wagner Act.”).
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actions that can be adjudicated in a timely manner. Not surprisingly,
the worst backlogs in agency adjudication occur in large benefits
programs in which private parties have autonomy over whether to
pursue their claims and the procedures are designed to make it easy
for them to do so.195 Agency control over which complaints are
docketed for an evidentiary hearing, however, may limit the ability of
private parties to serve as a strong check on agency capture.
Thus, agency designers can employ different attributes of
public and private enforcement to enhance agency expertise and
mitigate the dangers of decision mills, agency capture, and caseload
volatility. But no single combination will address all the risks
associated with specialized decisionmakers. Strong private rights of
action can address the problem of decision mills and capture, but at
the same time it risks caseload volatility by decreasing agency control
over enforcement.
C. Implementing Coherent and Politically Accountable
Public Policy
Another common justification for delegating decisions to
agencies is their ability to implement a more coherent national policy
with greater accountability to the political branches.196 Public
enforcement in administrative courts enhances agencies’ power to
make uniform national policy; facilitates the coordination of
policymaking across enforcement, adjudication, and rulemaking;197
195. See, e.g., BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, FISCAL YEAR 2008 REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN 3
(2009),
http://www.va.gov/Vetapp/ChairRpt/BVA2008AR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/495P-GKQ6]
(describing a year in which each “Veterans Law Judge” adjudicated 729 benefits cases); Eckholm,
supra note 149 (describing waiting periods of over five hundred days for social security disability
claims); Nancy J. Griswold, Appellant Forum – Update from OMHA, OFF. MEDICARE HEARINGS &
APPEALS (June 25, 2015), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/omha/OMHA Medicare
Appellant Forum/presentations_june_25_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L5L-N2DY] (describing
exploding backlog and growing processing times for claims adjudicated by the Office of Medicare
Hearing and Appeals).
196. It is of course true, notwithstanding the disavowals of nominees to the Supreme Court,
that courts make policy. But policymaking by courts, at least outside the constitutional context,
has less legitimacy than policymaking by politically accountable institutions. For this reason,
courts frequently try to minimize or hide their policymaking.
197. An important exception is the split enforcement regime, in which one agency makes the
final decisions in adjudication and another agency is responsible for rulemaking. For example,
the Occupational Safety and Health Act gives rulemaking and enforcement power to the
Secretary of Labor, 29 U.S.C. § 665 (2012), but delegates the adjudication of enforcement actions
to the Occupational Safety and Health Commission, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (2012). Similarly,
under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission adjudicates enforcement actions brought by the Department of Labor. 30 U.S.C.
§§ 815, 823 (2012).
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and gives agencies greater flexibility to adapt over time. At the same
time, however, adjudication by politically accountable policymakers
risks over- and underdeterrence and threatens the right of private
respondents to receive individualized decisions. Agencies address
these concerns in different ways. On the one hand, the bifurcation of
agency decisionmaking and judicial review addresses the danger of
overzealous enforcement. On the other hand, private enforcement
rights mitigate the danger of agency capture by political principals, or
at least make such capture more transparent.
1. Using Public Enforcement to Implement Policy
Public enforcement in agency adjudication enhances the power
of agencies to implement regulatory statutes in light of their policy
goals. Congress inevitably leaves gaps and ambiguities in its statutory
commands. How such gaps are filled and ambiguities resolved often
has important policy implications.198 Agencies approach these gaps
and ambiguities differently than courts.199 Courts generally strive to
reach what they consider to be the best understanding of the law
using all the tools of statutory interpretation. Agencies use many of
the same tools, but often use them differently.200 For example,
whereas some courts disavow legislative history, agencies tend to
emphasize it.201 More importantly, agency interpretations of law are
shaped by their regulatory agendas and subject-matter expertise.
Agencies openly consider the policy implications of their

198. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(noting that “the meaning or reach of a statute” often requires “a full understanding of the force
of the statutory policy in the given situation”).
199. There is a rich body of literature comparing the different approaches of courts and
agencies to interpreting the law. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s
Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 366
(2010) (“[T]he choice of delegate may be every bit as important as the choice to delegate.”);
Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the
Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2006) (discussing the
characteristics of agencies and courts “that might influence whether a rational legislator would
prefer to delegate authority to interpret an ambiguous statute” to one over the other).
200. See generally Glen Staszewski, Introduction to Symposium on Administrative Statutory
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (introducing symposium articles “explor[ing] the
nature of statutory interpretation by administrative agencies in the modern regulatory state”).
201. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 929 (2013) (finding that Congress drafts “both text and history . . . with agency
implementation in mind and often with agencies at the table”); id. at 972 (claiming that drafters
frequently “single[ ] out agencies as a key audience for legislative history”).
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interpretations,202 whereas courts may ignore, avoid, or not entirely
understand those implications. Agencies may also consider nonlegal
values, such as paternalism, bureaucratic rationality, and distinct
professional norms.203 Finally, agencies are likely to treat “different
interpretive questions in an ideologically consistent manner,” whereas
courts are less able to see across diverse interpretive questions within
a given regulatory area.204
Agencies are also influenced by their understanding of
congressional and White House preferences because they are highly
dependent on the approval of the political branches.205 Federal judges,
by contrast, are largely insulated from politics. Although judges are
nominated and confirmed by the Senate, it is usually impossible to
know the specific cases that any federal judge is likely to hear. Aside
from a few hot-button issues, the Senate avoids focusing on the policy
perspectives of judicial nominees. In contrast, the issues heard by an
agency are clearly delineated and the political branches focus on the
policy perspectives of executive branch nominees. Moreover, once
appointed, judges are not subject to White House review or removal,
unlike agency leadership. Finally, it is exceedingly difficult for
Congress to influence specific judicial interpretations ex post through
appropriations or correcting legislation. Thus, even independent
multimember commissions with appointees drawn from both parties
are more dependent on Congress and aligned with the president who
nominated them than federal judges.
a. Uniformity and Flexibility
Public enforcement in agency adjudication allows agencies to
implement more uniform national policies while retaining greater
flexibility to change their policies over time. By bringing enforcement
actions in an administrative rather than a judicial forum, the claims
are resolved using the agency’s understanding of the statute in light of
202. See Aaron J. Saiger, Agencies’ Obligation to Interpret the Statute, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1231, 1293–94 (2016) (arguing that agencies should instead seek the best interpretation of a
statute rather than a reasonable interpretation that aligns with their policymaking agenda); see
also Evan J. Criddle, The Constitution of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 325 (2016) (responding to Professor Saiger’s arguments).
203. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CLAIMS 23–34 (1983).
204. Stephenson, supra note 199, at 1047.
205. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an InterestGroup Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 887–88 (1974) (describing agencies as “eager[ ] to serve
the current legislature”). Most agency leadership is appointed by and may be removed by the
president or one of the heads of the departments.
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its policy goals, rather than the views of any one of the 2,758 federal
district judges. Moreover, federal courts may offer conflicting
interpretations of the law until the Supreme Court resolves the
relevant question.206 Although judicial review of agency adjudication
can also create inconsistencies in regulation, this risk is moderated by
judicial deference to agency interpretations,207 the concentration of
administrative review in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,208
and the ability of agencies to “nonacquiesce” in certain judicial
opinions.209
At the same time, agencies have more flexibility to change
their positions over time by bringing enforcement actions in
administrative courts. Agency adjudication is not typically bound by
stare decisis, while courts are bound by “super-strong” stare decisis
when interpreting statutory provisions.210 Thus, agencies may adjust
their legal interpretations in response to changes in their regulatory
environments or shifts in the political winds.211 Courts, by contrast,
are more likely to bring stability to the interpretation of the law over
time, shifting course incrementally as stare decisis permits. This can
be a virtue or a vice depending on the comparative value of flexibility
versus stability in a given context.212
b. Guidance to Nonparties
Agencies can provide more guidance to nonparties than courts.
While courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions, agencies
206. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 199, at 428–29 (noting the “substantial time lag” before the
Supreme Court is typically able to resolve lower courts’ misinterpretations).
207. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (recognizing a level of deference
for formal adjudication); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–
45 (1984) (recognizing a higher level of deference for reasonable agency interpretations of
statutory ambiguity).
208. See Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between
Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 232 (1996).
209. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 74, at 694–99, 706–10, 713–14 (discussing the
NLRB’s and IRS’s nonacquiescence policies); Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v.
Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1825 (1989) (“Justice Rehnquist
has suggested that any judicially imposed restraint on agency nonacquiescence usurps the
authority of the political branches of the government.”).
210. Stephenson, supra note 199, at 1047 (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988)).
211. Id. at 1047 & n.51, 1048 & n.52 (citing examples).
212. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 392 (2014)
(noting how presidential control over agency decisionmaking can undermine the stability of
government policy). Professor Stephenson suggests that the stability of courts across time may
be more valuable when reliance interests are at stake. See Stephenson, supra note 199, at 1058–
59.
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are encouraged to do so. While courts are institutionally adverse to
deciding more than is necessary, nothing prevents agencies from doing
so.213 While it is accepted that civil judgments will have retroactive
effect, administrative law attempts to limit the unfair surprise of new
agency policies that might upset settled reliance interests.214 Agencies
remain forward-looking in their decisions, seeking to guide those not
party to the proceeding. Public enforcement in agency adjudication
allows agencies to offer such guidance without relying on the federal
courts, which may be unwilling to provide it.
c. Coordination Across Policymaking Forms
Administrative enforcement also helps the head of the agency
coordinate policy across enforcement, adjudication, and rulemaking.
Public enforcement authority allows the agency to decide whether to
use rulemaking or adjudication to implement policy without waiting
for a private party to file the right case. If the agency also adjudicates
private enforcement actions, the agency can decide these cases
consistent with its own enforcement priorities and policy goals. In
addition, agency staff responsible for different functions may benefit
from the exchange of knowledge and experience made possible by the
integration of these activities in a single institution.215 For example,
the CFPB has included enforcement attorneys in its examinations of
regulated entities to “detect[ ] and assess[ ] risks to consumers and to
markets for consumer financial products and services.”216 According to
former director Richard Cordray, such coordination helps “the
supervision teams to understand where enforcement works, and why

213. See, e.g., Emily S. Bremer, The Agency Declaratory Judgment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1169,
1178 (2017) (discussing agencies’ ability to issue “binding rulings capable of providing clear and
certain guidance to regulated parties without requiring those parties first act on peril of
sanction”).
214. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (requiring
agencies to “provide a more detailed justification . . . when . . . its new policy rests upon factual
findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has
engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account”); NLRB. v. Bell Aerospace
Co. Div. of Textron, 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (limiting agencies’ ability to change policy in
adjudication when “new liability is sought to be imposed on individuals for past actions which
were taken in good-faith reliance on Board pronouncements”).
215. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 180, at 289 (noting how integration facilitates “awareness
of how a regulatory system is functioning”).
216. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5514(b)(1)(C), 5515(b)(1)(C) (2012).
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and how,” and helps “the enforcement team to understand how
supervision and examinations work.”217
Finally, because the head of the agency typically makes the
final decision in all modes of decisionmaking, she can coordinate these
activities and refer issues that arise in adjudicatory proceedings to the
staff involved in rulemaking.218 Adjudication allows agencies to
address new issues unanticipated by their rules. But it also allows
them to identify issues that arise in multiple cases and therefore may
be appropriate for rulemaking.219 Furthermore, the agency’s
adjudicators can provide a thoughtful first crack at a general rule by
personnel who see the cases that a rule might resolve more efficiently,
consistently, and fairly.220
2. The Risks of Overdeterrence and Underdeterrence
The overt policymaking character of agencies carries similar
risks to specialization. On the one hand, agencies may become
overzealous in their enforcement. They may become too focused on
narrow policy goals and overly aggressive in how they pursue and
decide cases.221 Respondents in SEC administrative proceedings, for
example, have complained that SEC ALJs reflect the “mind-set” of the
217. Dave Clarke, U.S. Consumer Cop Says Not Bullying Banks, REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/29/financial-regulation-cfpb-idUSL2E8ET7XL20120329
[https://perma.cc/W3L3-FZDB].
218. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 180, at 289 (“A decision writer in one agency stated that
during meetings regarding the content of an adjudicative opinion, she has seen the agency head
tell subordinates to change a regulatory scheme.”). The 1981 Model State Administrative
Procedure Act (“MSAPA”) contained a provision that “as soon as feasible, and to the extent
practicable, [agencies must] adopt rules . . . embodying appropriate standards, principles, and
procedural safeguards that the agency will apply to the law it administers.” MODEL STATE
ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 2-104(3) (amended 2010), 14 U.L.A. 73 (1981). This was abandoned in
the 2010 MSAPA. Nevertheless, some states have adopted similar requirements favoring
rulemaking whenever practicable. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(a) (2018); IOWA CODE § 17A.3(1)(c)
(2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-3-201(2)–(4) (West 2018).
219. For example, after an experienced adjudicator at the NVICP found a causal link
between the rubella vaccine and chronic arthritis, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
modified the Vaccine Injury Table to include “chronic arthritis” as an injury associated with the
rubella vaccine. See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Revision of the Vaccine
Injury Table, 60 Fed. Reg. 7,678, 7,692 (Feb. 8, 1995), revised by National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program: Revisions and Additions to the Vaccine Injury Table—2, 62 Fed. Reg.
7,685, 7,688 (Feb. 20, 1997). Similarly, the SSA’s medical-vocational guidelines were
promulgated in response to hearing many similar claims in adjudicatory proceedings. See
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 n.2 (1983).
220. Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 1688–89; see also Weaver, supra note
180, at 289 (“Those who decide cases arising from a regulatory program have a unique
perspective on the functioning of that program.”).
221. See Zaring, supra note 179, at 1217–18.
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agency’s enforcement agenda.222 Furthermore, coordination of
enforcement actions with other agency functions raises concerns that
the agency is not adjudicating cases based on their individual merit
but in pursuit of broader policy goals.223
On the other hand, greater agency control over enforcement
risks “political capture.” If the agency’s political principals oppose the
agency’s underlying statutory goals, they may block regulatory
enforcement in part or in whole. Agency control over enforcement
makes it possible for an administration to undermine the statutory
mandate and prevent private parties and the public writ large from
obtaining remedies for regulatory violations.224
Consequently, enhanced political control over enforcement may
result in large swings in enforcement, upsetting the reliance interests
of private parties and undermining the rule of law.225 Therefore,
agency designers must guard against over- and underenforcement and
the destabilization of government policy from administration to
administration.
3. Checks on Overzealous Enforcement
The procedures intended to make agencies more like courts
create checks on overzealous enforcement.226 Prohibitions on ex parte
communications and separation of functions restrain the agency’s
ability to implement policy without regard to the private interests at

222. Id. at 1214 (citing complaints reported in the news).
223. See also Clarke, supra note 217 (noting complaint by regulated entities that “the
presence of enforcement staff during routine inspection visits to banks [constituted] an
intimidation technique”). See generally Mogilnicki & Malpass, supra note 177, at 557.
224. See Engstrom, supra note 12, at 621 (“Given that private enforcement is designed at
least in part to counter possible agency capture, bringing agencies back into the picture risks
returning the fox to the henhouse.”).
225. In The Morality of Law, Lon Fuller identifies “frequent changes in rules that the subject
cannot orient his action by them” as one of eight ways in which a legal system may “misfire.”
LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1969); see also Minzner, supra note 109, at 2116
(explaining that specialists are particularly vulnerable to political pressure and “[f]ollowing
major enforcement failures . . . the political salience of enforcement switches and
overenforcement can result”); Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 212, at 392 (“[T]he difficulty of
changing the legal background regime allows parties to order their affairs with greater certainty
about the future. This in turn makes them more willing to invest in the future, increasing the
productive activity of society.”).
226. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1265–66 (1986) (“When an agency adjudicates it is required to assume a different posture
from its rulemaking mode. It must proceed roughly as a court would in determining the merits of
an individual claim.”).
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stake.227 “Once hired, an ALJ has virtual lifetime tenure without any
probationary period. . . . This set of provisions guarantees ALJ
independence” and challenges political control over adjudication.228
Although other administrative judges have less independence, they
still tend to have some—sometimes a lot—and view themselves as
judges.229 The relative independence of these decisionmakers is meant
to serve as a check on the risks created by the strong public character
of enforcement in agency adjudication. Independent administrative
judges encourage agencies to articulate the standards under which
public enforcement actions are judged and enhance the transparency
of changes in agency policy.230
Of course, final agency decisions are usually in the hands of
political appointees. Political appointees approach adjudication from a
different perspective than administrative judges and seek to
implement administration policy. Consequently, agency leadership
may serve as an additional check on overzealous enforcement or may
be a cause of it. Some argue that political appointees check the tunnel
vision of civil service employees because they come to their jobs with a
fresh perspective and more political accountability.231 But political
appointees may also seek to push the agency to be more aggressive in
its enforcement. It depends on the policy goals of the administration.
Finally, and most importantly, judicial review serves as a check
on overzealous enforcement based on legal interpretations that are not
reasonable. Giving private parties aggrieved by agency action the
right to judicial review of final agency action inconsistent with its

227. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032, 1075 (2011) (explaining that the APA and Due Process Clause provide agency adjudicators
with “some level of independence” and “[p]olicymakers . . . have sometimes found adjudicators
frustrating precisely because of” how independence impacts “adjudication’s inefficiency and
inconsistency as a policymaking instrument”); Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal
Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1354 (1992) (describing “the continuing saga of
the SSA’s attempts to place productivity and quality-control standards on the ALJs who decide
its disability cases”); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis:
An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1414, 1473 (2012) (“[A]dministrative law judges . . . enjoy some measure of decisional
independence from other agency staff, including from senior policymakers.”).
228. Asimow, supra note 170, at 1009.
229. See Koch, supra note 82, at 278–81.
230. The role that independent ALJs play in balancing the policymaking agenda of agencies
supports calls for more, not less, independence. Cf. Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to
Administrative Adjudication Should Succeed, 81 MO. L. REV. 1023 (2016) (arguing that non-ALJ
adjudication of disputes between agencies and nongovernmental parties violates due process).
231. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1858
(2015); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Reins Act and the Struggle to Control Agency Rulemaking, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 185 (2013).

Sant’Ambrogio_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

478

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

3/26/2019 2:13 PM

[Vol. 72:2:425

organic statute allows Congress to leverage private resources to
monitor and police agency drift.232 Thus, to the extent that bifurcated
decisionmaking fails to restrain overzealous enforcement or the
political leadership pushes the agency to overreach, federal courts
serve as a final check on agency action beyond its statutory authority.
4. Private Enforcement as a Check on Political Capture
The tools that check overzealous enforcement are not as
effective at checking underenforcement. While agency action provides
a focus for adjudication by independent decisionmakers,
administrative judges never decide cases not brought.233 Although the
APA gives courts the power to compel “agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed,”234 the Supreme Court has
generally shielded an agency’s decision not to bring an enforcement
action from judicial review.235 The main hurdle is the presumption
against the reviewability of enforcement decisions under the APA
announced by the Supreme Court in Heckler v. Chaney.236 There are
exceptions to the presumption and some debate about whether it
applies to enforcement policies or only individual enforcement
decisions.237 Nevertheless, the presumption gives agencies significant
latitude in their enforcement choices.238 Moreover, sometimes it is
difficult even to know whether an agency has adopted an explicit
enforcement policy against bringing certain types of cases.239
232. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 271–73 (1987).
233. See Staszewski, supra note 27 (proposing the establishment of a “Federal Inaction
Commission” to address the chronic problem of nonenforcement decisions and other regulatory
inaction).
234. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012).
235. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 (1985).
236. Id.
237. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 176–77
(1996) (describing debate); Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 27, at 1406 n.115 (discussing exceptions).
238. This is not to say that determined lower courts can never find a way around the
presumption. As an example, the lower courts did check the Obama administration’s use of
enforcement discretion to change immigration policy. But the Supreme Court deadlocked in the
case and never provided a reasoned opinion. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
239. Andrias, supra note 26, at 1043 (noting that changes in agency enforcement policies
typically do not require procedures to enhance transparency). For example, during President
George W. Bush’s first term, the Employment Litigation Section of the DOJ did not file a single
lawsuit alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination against African Americans and the
number of individual cases challenging racial discrimination fell dramatically. CITIZENS’ COMM’N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS & CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE EROSION OF RIGHTS: DECLINING CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 29 (William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/03/pdf/civil_rights_report.pdf
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Private enforcement mechanisms mitigate the dangers of
political capture of agency enforcement, or at least increase its
transparency. Private parties with procedural rights in administrative
schemes are not completely dependent on public enforcers. If agencies
must respond to the complaints of private parties and provide reasons
for not pursuing enforcement actions, the agency’s decisionmaking
will be more transparent. If private parties have an independent right
to demand evidentiary hearings on their claims, they need not wait on
agency enforcement at all. But even where public enforcement is
exclusive and private parties are only entitled to agency review of
their complaints, if the enforcement decision is subject to clear
standards, administrative appeal, and judicial review, the private
parties will likely have quicker and potentially more effective recourse
than in a pure public enforcement scheme where citizens must
challenge agency inaction. In addition, the agency may be less likely to
take legally indefensible positions when subject to public, political,
and judicial scrutiny. Finally, increased transparency facilitates
congressional oversight and affords citizens the opportunity to
respond at the ballot box.
*

*

*

In sum, combining elements of public and private enforcement
in administrative courts facilitates the goals of agency adjudication
while mitigating some of the risks it poses to legitimate
decisionmaking. Public enforcers assist private parties seeking
regulatory benefits, thus allowing agency adjudication to provide
greater legal access to remedies while maintaining greater procedural
protections for regulated parties. The procedural rights of regulatory
beneficiaries encourage them to supplement the information resources
of public regulators at the same time as specialized decisionmakers
avail themselves of the experience acquired through hearing many
similar cases in a discrete area of law. Public enforcement allows
agencies to pursue consistent policies across different modes of
[https://perma.cc/Z8S8-ZKWB]. But the DOJ did not completely abandon race discrimination
claims, even as it shifted resources to “reverse discrimination” claims on behalf of white
Americans, religious discrimination claims, and human trafficking. Id.; Charlie Savage, Justice
Department to Recharge Civil Rights Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/us/politics/01rights.html
[https://perma.cc/F3NW-VY9N]
(“Under the Bush administration, the agency shifted away from its traditional core focus on
accusations of racial discrimination, channeling resources into areas like religious discrimination
and human trafficking.”). There was no final agency action memorializing the shift in policy that
a party could challenge in court.
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decisionmaking, while the procedural rights of private parties
mitigate the risks of political capture, or at least make it more
transparent.
Table 3 summarizes the goals of agency adjudication, the tools
used to achieve them, the risks they create, and the functions of public
and private enforcement.
TABLE 3: GOALS AND RISKS OF AGENCY ADJUDICATION

Tools
Risks

Legal access
Informal and
tailored
procedures
Inaccurate and
illegitimate
decisions

Goal
Decisionmaking
Informed by
Expertise
Specialized
decisionmakers;
agency expertise
“Decision mills”;
“agency capture”;
caseload volatility

Public
Enforcement

Assists
regulatory
beneficiaries;
maintains
process for
respondents

Reduces caseload
volatility; checks
decision mills and
certain capture

Private
Enforcement

Furthers legal
access

Supplements
agency
information;
checks agency
capture

Coherent and
Accountable
Policy
Political
appointees;
agency forum
Illegitimate
decisions;
“political
capture”
Enables
policymaking
using
enforcement;
enhances
coordination and
political
accountability
Checks political
capture;
enhances
transparency
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IV. STRUCTURING HYBRID ENFORCEMENT IN AGENCY ADJUDICATION
Agencies use attributes of public and private enforcement in
various combinations. Yet many administrative schemes cluster on
the public side of the enforcement continuum.240 Part IV explains this
tendency and suggests factors for policymakers to consider when
designing administrative enforcement.
A. Comparing Private Enforcement in Two Forums
Private enforcement in administrative and judicial forums
share many similarities. But there are also important differences.
These differences may explain why agency designers often leverage
the information resources of private parties without giving them
independent enforcement authority.
1. Comparing the Benefits in Each Forum
Private parties supplement public enforcement in both judicial
and administrative forums. Public enforcers face the same resource
constraints in administrative courts as they do in federal court, even if
administrative enforcement is less expensive.241 Thus, regardless of
the forum, private parties allow Congress to leverage private
resources in pursuit of public goods.
Private parties do a particularly good job supplementing the
information resources of agencies in administrative enforcement. Even
when agencies have exclusive enforcement authority, public actions
often originate in the complaints and investigations triggered by
private parties.242 Moreover, unlike private enforcement in federal
court, the knowledge of private parties is fed directly into the agency’s
administrative process and considered by the agency leadership. As a
result, the information derived from private complaints improves the
agency’s understanding of its regulatory environment and informs
rulemaking and other activities beyond enforcement and
adjudication.243
The success of private enforcement at checking or providing an
alternative to agency capture, as it does in federal court, has been
more limited, however. Without the power to obtain decisions on
240.
241.
242.
243.

See supra Part III and infra Appendix A.
SKOWRONEK, supra note 91, at 146; Verkuil, supra note 227, at 1344.
See, e.g., KOCH, supra note 13, § 5:31.
See supra notes 215–218 and accompanying text.
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complaints based on the record of an evidentiary hearing, private
enforcement in administrative courts cannot provide the same
alternative to public enforcement as private rights of action in federal
court. Procedural rights to file complaints alone will do little to check
an agency that is opposed to enforcement due to the presumption
against the reviewability of enforcement decisions announced in
Heckler v. Chaney.244 Even the power to trigger an investigation and
the right to an agency decision on whether to proceed with
enforcement are unlikely to move an agency that is determined not to
act given highly deferential judicial review, even if a written decision
will enhance the transparency of public policy. Private parties can
only serve as a check on captured enforcement, however, when they
have enforcement rights analogous to private rights of action in
federal court—i.e., the right to a reasoned decision from the agency
based on the record of an evidentiary hearing.
But even private rights of action comparable to those in federal
court will not have the same impact as private enforcement in
administrative courts if the agency is committed to a more
conservative enforcement policy. Because of judicial deference to
agency decisions in formal adjudication, courts are unlikely to secondguess an agency’s refusal to adopt a novel interpretation of law in
response to a private complaint. Private parties in court, by contrast,
may find a judge they can persuade to push the law in a new direction.
2. Comparing the Costs in Each Forum
The core objection to private enforcement in federal court is
that it upsets carefully calibrated public enforcement schemes.245 This
objection is not as salient in administrative courts. Because the agency
generally makes the final decision in agency adjudication and its
interpretations are granted deference from reviewing courts, there is
less risk that private parties will upset regulatory policy by bringing
novel, adventuresome claims inconsistent with the agency’s
understanding of its statutory mandate. Agencies can reject such
claims and the federal courts will generally defer to the agency on
review, so long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. Thus,
agencies are better equipped to protect their enforcement policies from
private enforcement in agency adjudication than in federal court.

244. 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 (1985).
245. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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There is also less danger that private enforcement in
administrative courts will be driven by short-term financial incentives
rather than the public interest.246 This critique is largely aimed at tort
actions that yield large monetary awards, such as federal damage
class actions.247 There are fewer monetary awards available to private
parties in agency adjudication and those that do exist are generally
smaller than in federal court.248 This might change if agencies adopt
class actions in private enforcement schemes with monetary remedies
rather than injunctive relief. But to date, administrative class actions
have largely been used to resolve claims against the government.249
The relative absence of large monetary awards to private parties in
agency adjudication cuts against concerns that private enforcement in
administrative courts will result in overdeterrence.250
Nevertheless, enhancing private rights of action and
eliminating exclusive agency control over enforcement would likely
increase the number of administrative proceedings before the
agency.251 If the agency must review a large number of adjudicatory
decisions, it will face difficulty bringing consistency to its
interpretation of the law, undermining a coherent and consistent
national policy.252 Thus, there is a danger in oversupplementing the
resources of public enforcers in administrative courts. The more cases
on the agency’s docket, the more likely the agency will struggle to
maintain control over the meaning and application of the law. Unless
a class action or other aggregate device is available to ensure
consistent outcomes in similar cases,253 some of the potential benefits
of agency adjudication will be lost.254
In addition, if agency adjudicators have a proregulatory bias,
enhanced private rights may exacerbate the risk of overzealous
enforcement. Without the resource constraints that limit public
246. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
247. See Carroll, supra note 40, at 864–65.
248. See William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?—Using Informal Procedures for
Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 16–19 (1993).
249. See Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 1696.
250. But as noted above, overdeterrence is possible when the agency itself is committed to
overdeterrence and leverages the resources of private parties.
251. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1206 (“[P]rivate initiation rights may raise
serious problems for regulatory administration. Successful suits could squander agency resources
on isolated, minor controversies, thereby diverting energy from larger patterns of misconduct.”).
252. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 168, at 415 (“There are times when we simply have to
learn to live with unequal justice because the alternatives are worse.”).
253. Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 1682.
254. Although rulemaking can help an agency streamline its docket prospectively, it is often
too little, too late to handle spikes in claims. Id. at 1693–95.
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enforcement, large numbers of private actions, and possibly even
settlements outside of administrative proceedings, may result in
overregulation. Thus, overdeterrence may pose a greater risk during
some administrations than it does during others due to centralized
control over the adjudication of enforcement actions.
These concerns may explain why the private rights in many
administrative schemes do not include full independent enforcement
authority. It also suggests that it is better to enhance private
enforcement in administrative schemes that leverage the
informational advantages of private parties rather than their sheer
numbers. In addition, Congress may want to require agency approval
of private settlements to ensure they do not result in regulation
without political accountability.
3. Agency Tools for Mitigating the Risks of Private Enforcement
Agencies have tools unavailable to courts to check claims that
are duplicative, wasteful, or inconsistent with the exercise of
reasonable enforcement discretion. Unlike federal courts, agencies are
generally not bound by the Rules Enabling Act, which prohibits
Article III courts from “prescrib[ing] general rules of practice and
procedure” that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”255
Therefore, agencies may preclude private actions that advance
technically valid legal claims yet are duplicative or wasteful in light of
the agency’s overall enforcement policy.
The danger with giving agencies the power to block private
suits, of course, is that it threatens to obstruct private enforcement if
the agency is captured. Moreover, suits based on novel legal theories
are not always socially undesirable. Private parties often push the law
in new directions that eventually come to enjoy broad public support.
Therefore, an agency “veto” over private enforcement is preferable to
agency “licensing,”256 as it will make capture more transparent. In
addition, agencies should provide good reasons for blocking arguably
meritorious suits on the grounds that they are inconsistent with the
agency’s enforcement priorities.
That said, blocking duplicative suits raises fewer concerns with
capture because the agency is bringing its own enforcement action.
Thus, if Congress provides private parties robust enforcement rights,
it should also consider giving agencies the power to check redundant
255. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
256. Engstrom, supra note 12, at 679–80.
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private actions when the agency is, in fact, enforcing. The agency
could then require private parties to participate in similar public
actions or create an aggregate proceeding in which the agency pursues
the action on behalf of a class of beneficiaries.257 If the agency takes up
the complaint, the private party would have the option of joining the
agency’s enforcement action. If the agency declines to pursue the
claim, the private party would have the option of pursuing
nonduplicative enforcement actions.258
Giving private parties greater enforcement rights in
administrative proceedings may inevitably decrease agency control
over their caseloads. Whether the benefits are worth the costs depends
on whether inaction due to capture is an acute problem in the
particular administrative scheme. In some cases, more limited private
rights to file complaints, trigger investigations, or join public actions
will provide enough benefits of private enforcement without a stronger
check on capture. Even a requirement that agencies respond to
complaints in writing will increase the transparency of agency policy.
But the pervasive use of enforcement discretion to underenforce may
call for enhancing private enforcement in some contexts.
B. Enhancing Private Rights to Check Agency Inaction
Private enforcement is an additional tool agency designers can
use to address political or interest group capture of agency
enforcement. But it is not costless. Moving from theory to practice,
this Section considers several recent cases of nonenforcement and
weighs the advantages and disadvantages of enhancing private rights
of action.
1. The Challenge of Political Nonenforcement
The growth over the last several decades of what thenProfessor Elena Kagan called “presidential administration” has put
increasing pressure on the ability of agencies to implement their
statutory mandates.259 The power of the executive to “course correct”

257. See Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 149, at 2003–06, 2035–36.
258. Several environmental statutes, for example, allow the Environmental Protection
Agency to displace private enforcement actions in federal court only if it brings its own public
enforcement action. See Engstrom, supra note 12, at 650–51, 651 n.115 (listing major federal
environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, that have “citizen suit”
provisions).
259. Kagan, supra note 25.
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within broad statutory parameters without awaiting congressional
action can have significant normative benefits.260 But presidents of
both parties are frequently tempted to use the levers of government to
thwart mandates they cannot repeal through the legislative process.261
This often takes the form of presidential appointees adopting either
nonenforcement or particularly selective enforcement policies at the
agencies they lead.262

260. See, e.g., id. at 2331–39 (explaining that presidential control over administration
promotes accountability by enhancing transparency and establishing an “electoral link between
the public and the bureaucracy”); Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 212, at 381–85 (identifying the
disadvantages of generally applicable laws but still recognizing that it is “more efficient for the
Executive to define categories of cases that represent poor fits with the law than to repeatedly
adjudicate common issues in each individual case”). The legislative process is often slow,
laborious, and particularly ill-suited to making incremental changes in policy when there is little
consensus around broader policy objectives. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,
75 VA. L. REV. 431, 435–40 (1989) (modeling the structural difficulties Congress faces when
seeking to respond to agency action); see also McCubbins et al., supra note 232 (using the
principal-agent framework to analyze congressional control of the administrative state).
261. See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2347 (noting how “presidential administration might
displace the preferences of a prior (rather than of the contemporaneous) Congress by interpreting
statutes inconsistently with their drafters’ objectives”). For example, the Obama administration
instituted the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program after the Development,
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (“DREAM”) Act died in the 112th Congress. See Julia
Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A1; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec.,
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States
as Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MSQ5-RDCC].
Additionally, the Trump administration stepped up efforts to undermine the Affordable Care Act
through executive action after repeal efforts failed in Congress. See Peter Sullivan & Rachel
Roubein, Critics See Trump Sabotage on ObamaCare, HILL (Oct. 7, 2017), https://thehill.com/
policy/healthcare/354308-trump-sabotage-seen-on-obamacare
[https://perma.cc/9JT6-D6GA]
(describing how the Trump administration undermined enrollment, cut subsidies, and limited
coverage).
262. For a collection of examples of nonenforcement from the Reagan, Bush, and Obama
administrations, see Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119,
1125–36 (2015). Such political capture of agency adjudication may worsen in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s opinion last term in Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), which held that ALJs
are officers of the United States who must be appointed under the Appointments Clause by the
president or the heads of the departments. See also Exec. Order No. 13843, 83 Fed Reg. 32,755
(July 10, 2018) (excepting ALJs from the competitive hiring rules and examinations of the OPM).
Classifying ALJs as “inferior officers” for purposes of appointment might also result in them
being removable at will. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 484 (2010) (holding that more than one layer of for-cause removal protections violates the
Vesting and Take Care Clauses of Article II). But see id. at 507 n.10 (suggesting that ALJs may
be distinguishable from Public Company Accounting Oversight Board members due to their
adjudicative functions). Although the relationship between ALJ independence and the
Appointments Clause is beyond the scope of this Article, independent decisionmakers are
important to controlling overzealous public enforcement and enabling meaningful private
enforcement in agency adjudication.
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Congressional enacting coalitions rely heavily on judicial
review initiated by private parties to keep agencies in line with their
statutory mandates.263 To date, judicial review has done a decent job
checking the use of rulemaking and enforcement actions to push
agencies beyond what the law allows.264 Due to the presumption
against the reviewability of enforcement decisions,265 however, judicial
review is less effective at checking agency decisions not to enforce.266
This weakness in judicial review has profound implications for
agency adjudication. When agency adjudication relies heavily on
public enforcement, with few private rights, the agency has broad
discretion regarding which complaints to pursue.267 Placing control of
enforcement in the hands of an agency virtually eliminates the ability
of courts to check agency inaction.268 Inasmuch as Congress uses
agency adjudication to provide parties with relief unavailable in
court,269 such inaction is generally inconsistent with the agency’s
underlying statutory mandate.
2. Inside Agency Nonenforcement
Increased presidential control over the administrative state
and the use of nonenforcement to obstruct statutory mandates raises
the question of whether agency designers should enhance private
rights in administrative programs. Consider the following recent
examples of agency nonenforcement:
•

After the Trump administration took office, the Department
of Education (“DOE”) stopped pursuing enforcement actions

263. McCubbins et al., supra note 232, at 271–74.
264. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (vacating a rule that undermined the statutory goal of improving motor vehicle safety);
Barkow, supra note 12, at 1139 n.37 (“[C]urrent doctrine does a better job checking affirmative
agency action than addressing ‘excessive agency inaction.’ ” (quoting Brett McDonnell & Daniel
Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1646 (2011))).
265. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 (1985).
266. Barkow, supra note 12, at 1131–34; Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory
Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1646 (2011); Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 27, at 1405; Stewart
& Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1205–06.
267. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1205–06 (discussing deferential review of agency
decisions not to enforce).
268. See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text. Even the CFPB under former director
Richard Cordray, which was known for its vigorous pursuit of consumer protection and public
responsiveness, was accused of ignoring certain complaints filed by consumers. See Matthew
Goldstein & Stacy Cowley, Casting Wall Street as Victim, Trump Leads Charge on Deregulation,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2017, at B1 (describing criticism of the CFPB’s complaint process as “a
portal to nowhere”).
269. See supra Section II.A.
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against schools accused of misrepresentation or fraud by
student borrowers.270 Student borrowers may seek relief
from repayment of their federal loans from the Department,
but DOE’s Student Aid Enforcement Unit has exclusive
authority to initiate administrative proceedings against the
schools to recoup the money.271 For nearly a year, DOE did
not adjudicate a single borrower defense claim by students
defrauded by their schools and the backlog of claims grew to
more than eighty-seven thousand.272 In the meantime,
student borrowers are forced to make payments on loans
they assert they do not owe, attempt to negotiate a
deferment or forbearance to temporarily relieve them of the
obligation of making payments or default on their loans and
become subject to coercive collection mechanisms, including
wage garnishment and tax offsets.273 The Department
began offering partial relief to the student borrowers in
December 2017, but to date the Trump administration has

270. Letter from Acting Under Sec’y James Manning to Senator Richard J. Durbin (July
7, 2017) https://www.durbin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/17-010570%20Durbin%20Outgoing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YDF9-8F5P]; Yan Cao & Tariq Habash, College Complaints Unmasked: 99
Percent of Student Fraud Claims Concern For-Profit Colleges, CENTURY FOUND. (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://tcf.org/content/report/college-complaints-unmasked
[https://perma.cc/7NSQ-FAPA];
Danielle Douglas-Gabrielle, Trump Administration is Sitting on Tens of Thousands of Student
Debt Forgiveness Claims, WASH. POST (July 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/grade-point/wp/2017/07/27/trump-administration-is-sitting-on-tens-of-thousands-of-student
-debt-forgiveness-claims [https://perma.cc/H6LC-ZCEL]. Under the Higher Education Act of
1965, student borrowers may seek discharge of certain federal student loans based on any “act or
omission of the school attended by the student that would give rise to a cause of action against
the school under applicable State law.” 34 C.F.R. § 685.206(c)(1) (2018). Congress directed the
Secretary of Education in 1993 to “specify in regulations which acts or omissions of an institution
of higher education a borrower may assert as a defense to repayment of” certain federal loans.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (2012) (codified at
20 U.S.C. § 1087e(h) (2012)). The Secretary promulgated the regulations the following year.
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,664 (Dec. 1, 1994) (codified at 34
C.F.R. § 685.100). In 2016, the Secretary amended the regulations to provide more efficient,
consistent, and fair procedures for resolving student-borrower applications for relief. Amended
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,926 (Nov. 1, 2016). But after a
change in administration, the new Secretary of Education suspended the new regulations,
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 49,114 (Oct. 24, 2017), and stopped
processing existing applications for loan discharges.
271. 81 Fed. Reg. at 75,926 (“Individual claims will be decided in a non-adversarial process
managed by a Department official, and group claims would be brought by the Department
against the school, not by students.”).
272. See Cao & Habash, supra note 270, at fig.2, n.53.
273. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief & Demand for Jury Trial at 6, 118–22, Carr v.
Devos (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17-cv-8790) (providing an example of a student borrower whose
student loans had been placed in forbearance by the Department of Education’s loan servicer
after the student had asserted complete defenses to the repayment of her loans).
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not pursued any actions against the schools accused of
misrepresentations or fraud.274
Barely forty-eight hours after President Trump named
Mick Mulvaney Acting Director of the CFPB in November
2017, its lawyers began pulling back the agency’s
enforcement efforts.275 The CFPB is responsible for
enforcing prohibitions on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts
and practices in connection with consumer financial
products and services.276 Under the previous director, the
agency had used consumer complaints to inform its
investigations, enforcement actions, and rulemaking. But
the CFPB has exclusive authority to pursue administrative
enforcement actions before an ALJ.277 Although it is too
early to assess the full scope of the rollback, Mr. Mulvaney
announced, “This place will be different, under my
leadership and under whoever follows me.” Mr. Mulvaney
had previously denounced the agency he now leads as a
“ ‘sad, sick’ example of bureaucracy gone amok.”278

In each case, imbuing the administrative scheme with private
rights of action, paired with a requirement that agencies give
reasoned explanations for changes in policy,279 would reduce political
capture or at least make it more transparent. If student borrowers had
the right to file complaints directly against schools that defrauded
them and to receive a decision from an administrative judge on the
record of an evidentiary hearing, the regulatory scheme would
continue to function when the DOE was not pursuing its own
enforcement actions. The administrative judge would follow existing
policy until changed by a new administration through rulemaking or
adjudication. If the Secretary of Education wished to preclude these
claims she would have to offer reasons on the record. The Secretary
would be more likely to refrain from such action unless she had good

274. See Cao & Habash, supra note 270. It has not gone unnoticed that both the President
and the Secretary of Education presiding over the shutdown have had stakes in for-profit
schools, which constitute virtually all of the complaints in the backlog.
275. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Stacy Cowley, Trump Appointee Moves to Yank Out a
Consumer Watchdog’s Teeth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2017, at B1.
276. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2) (2012).
277. 12 C.F.R. § 1081.200 (2018).
278. Silver-Greenberg & Cowley, supra note 275.
279. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (stating that the
agency must give good reasons for the changed policy); Staszewski, supra note 193, at 1281 (“The
practice of reason-giving further limits the scope of available discretion over time . . . .”).
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reasons to pursue them. And if the Secretary changed policy using
either rulemaking or adjudication, the private claimant could seek
judicial review in federal court. Student borrowers would not have to
clear the hurdle of Heckler v. Chaney when faced with DOE
inaction.280
Similarly, if consumers had the right to pursue enforcement
actions against financial institutions in the CFPB, the Director of the
CFPB would have to provide reasons for rejecting their claims,
perhaps explaining why a favorable ALJ’s decision under the old
policy was inconsistent with his understanding of the relief afforded
under the law.
Of course, it would be only a matter of time before a new
administration determined to roll back enforcement implemented a
narrower interpretation of the law, either through rulemaking or
adjudication. It is reasonable for administrations to choose different
enforcement priorities and interpret legal ambiguities in light of their
policy goals. But instead of simply sitting on complaints, the agency
would need to use rulemaking or adjudication to explain why the
private parties should not prevail. This, after all, is the heart of
adjudication: a decision based on reasoned proofs.281
Moreover, changes in policy through rulemaking or
adjudication would allow judicial review to serve as a check on new
policies inconsistent with any reasonable understanding of the
statute.282 Thus, private rights of action can enhance the transparency
of changes in policy and facilitate judicial review as a check on
changes that undermine the statutory goals.

280. The case of student borrowers also suggests that agencies respond to even weak
procedural rights of private parties. Although the DOE sat on student-borrower defense claims
for nearly a year, it eventually adjudicated their claims. Nevertheless, the information they
provided the agency concerning violations by for-profit schools did not compel the agency to bring
its own enforcement actions. Moreover, the DOE’s unwillingness to discharge the full amount of
the student borrower’s loans may have stemmed from the fact that the DOE would not recoup
the taxpayer’s money from the schools in enforcement actions.
281. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364–65
(1978).
282. Greater private enforcement rights would also help mitigate the related problem of
regulatory capture, which may be a more acute risk in specialized public enforcement. Minzner,
supra note 109, at 2139–40.
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Consider a third example from the current administration:
•

After a change in political control of the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”) in December 2017, the Board
rapidly changed its position on “several Obama-era NLRB
rulings that made it easier for workers to unionize and
defend against employer labor law violations.”283 The Board
issued lengthy opinions explaining its reversals in three
pending cases.284

Unlike the prior examples, the Board’s decisions not to grant
relief are subject to judicial review.285 Thus, aggrieved parties can
make their case to a federal court that the agency’s changes in policy
are arbitrary and capricious. Meanwhile, the Board will continue to
grant relief in cases that have merit based on its interpretation of law.
This is not to suggest the NLRB is a model administrative agency. It
has been criticized for many reasons.286 Moreover, the Board issued
these decisions in cases brought by the Board’s prior general counsel.
The new general counsel could adopt a policy of non- or selective
nonenforcement with highly deferential review.287 But the decisions
illustrate the benefits of agencies ruling against complaints in
283. Trump NLRB Majority Moves Fast to Reverse Obama-era Decisions, NWLABORPRESS
(Jan. 3, 2018), https://nwlaborpress.org/2018/01/trump-nlrb-majority-moves-fast-to-reverseobama-era-decisions [https://perma.cc/992A-LPJ6] (describing three reversals in December 2017).
284. See, e.g., Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. 156 (2017) (thirty-five-page
opinion overruling Browning-Ferris and “return[ing] to the principles governing joint-employer
status that existed prior to that decision,” along with a twelve-page dissent); Boeing Co., 365
N.L.R.B. 154 (2017) (twenty-three-page opinion creating a new test for evaluating employers’
work rules, along with twenty-one pages of dissenting opinions). The ALJ decisions contrary to
the Board’s decisions are also part of the record before the court on review. Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492 (1951).
285. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2012):
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board . . . may obtain a review of such
order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor
practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person
resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia . . . .
But see Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking and the
Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 404 (1995) (arguing that “the agency’s practice of
hiding behind multifactored tests instead of acknowledging well-defined rules of decision makes
judicial review of its policymaking much more difficult”).
286. See, e.g., Fisk & Malamud, supra note 96, at 2019 (criticizing the Board’s lack of access
to social science data and analysis developed by its own staff, resulting in “a formalistic style of
adjudicatory reasoning that packages questions of policy as questions of law”).
287. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 227, at 1059 n.74 (citing Rosenblum, supra note 194); see
also Kevin Frekng, Senate Confirms General Counsel for Labor Board, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-11-08/senate-confirms-general-counsel-forlabor-board [https://perma.cc/BZC2-S53S].
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adjudication rather than blocking them using nonenforcement.
Changes in policy through adjudication enhance the transparency of
public policy and facilitate judicial review. Without strong private
rights of action, injured parties are left to challenge nonenforcement
as an abdication of enforcement responsibility or an unreasonable
delay under the APA, which are notoriously difficult claims to win.288
Nevertheless,
enhancing
private
rights
to
check
nonenforcement has costs. If the agency must adjudicate a large
number of private complaints, it may have difficulty implementing a
consistent policy and struggle with caseload volatility. In addition, a
proregulatory agency may leverage private resources to overenforce.
These risks suggest that enhanced private rights might be more
appropriate for student-borrower claims against schools charged with
misrepresentations than consumer claims against businesses charged
with unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices in connection
with consumer financial products and services. Although the number
of student borrowers is quite large, it is dwarfed by the pool of
potential complaints regarding consumer financial products and
services.289 In addition, while Americans typically take out educational
loans at a distinct time in their lives, they engage in consumer
financial transactions nearly every day over the course of their entire
lives. Given the CFPB’s broad mandate to protect consumers “from
unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from
discrimination,”290 one can imagine a massive number of private
enforcement actions if the agency provided an inexpensive and
informal forum for these claims.291 Student-borrower complaints, by
contrast, are more focused: 98.6 percent of the complaints received by
DOE through 2017 involved for-profit colleges and three-fourths of all
claims were against schools owned by a for-profit entity.292 Thus,
increased private enforcement for student-borrower claims should be
easier for the agency to manage than private rights of action against

288. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 27, at 1448 & n.15.
289. Forty-four million Americans currently have student loan debt as compared to 80
million mortgages, 106 million auto loans, and 192 million credit card holders. In its first three
years alone, the CFPB handled more than 558,800 consumer complaints regarding mortgages,
debt collection practices, credit reporting, credit cards, consumer loans, student loans, and other
such unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices. CONSUMER RESPONSE, supra note 129. The
DOE received just under 100,000 student complaints during roughly the same period. Cao &
Habash, supra note 270.
290. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2) (2012).
291. See supra note 289.
292. Cao & Habash, supra note 270.
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financial institutions for unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and
practices.
The question of manageability may also explain the greater
role of private parties in enforcement by the NLRB, which hears a
narrower category of cases than either the DOE or the CFPB.293 The
NLRB falls along the middle of the public-private enforcement
continuum.294 But enhancing private rights in the NLRB should be
manageable if Congress chose to highlight changes in policy using
nonenforcement and subject them to greater judicial review.
C. Choosing a Forum for Private Enforcement
The role of private enforcement in agency adjudication opens
up new lines of inquiry regarding the choice of forum for private rights
of action. Although deserving of greater study than possible in this
Article, this Section offers some preliminary thoughts.
Procedural rights in administrative courts encourage private
parties to supplement the information resources of agencies in
enforcement, adjudication, and rulemaking more directly than private
enforcement in federal court. Thus, some minimum procedural rights
to file complaints, trigger investigations, and obtain reasoned (even if
informal) decisions will likely be appropriate in many administrative
schemes.
When deciding whether to create private rights in an agency,
federal court, or both, Congress should consider the importance of
access to an informal and inexpensive forum for dispute resolution.
Private rights are less important for checking capture in agency
adjudication when private enforcement is available in federal court.
Nevertheless, if the costs and formalities of federal court are an
impediment to private enforcement, Congress may want to utilize an
agency forum. Congress often creates administrative schemes because
of perceived difficulties of achieving its goals using the courts.295
In addition, Congress should consider the importance of
uniformity, regulatory coherence, and political accountability in
implementing policy. Placing private rights in agency adjudication
mitigates the central critique of private enforcement in federal court—
that private parties will disrupt a carefully calibrated, politically
accountable public enforcement scheme. Uniformity and coherence in
293. See supra note 289.
294. See supra Table 2.
295. See supra Section II.A.
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adjudication are important when enforcement is one piece of an
integrated regulatory program. This weighs in favor of DOE
adjudication of student-borrower complaints against schools because
the DOE is responsible for disbursing and discharging the student
borrowers’ federal loans.
Agency adjudication of private actions also facilitates a uniform
national interpretation of the law accountable to the political
branches, while federal courts allow issues to percolate over time.
Political accountability may be more important when Congress
legislates broad statutory commands subject to diverse interpretations
or is uncertain about the direction of policy and less important when
Congress legislates with specificity. But even with broad statutory
mandates, Congress may want the greater long-term stability afforded
by federal courts if it is concerned with how changes in administration
will impact reliance interests.296
Finally, Congress should be cautious of supplementing agency
resources with private rights where there are large pools of potential
claimants who might overwhelm the agency’s docket and increase the
risk of backlogs, inconsistent decisionmaking, or overenforcement. If
Congress is concerned that robust private enforcement will threaten
the consistency and accountability of agency adjudication, then it may
make more sense to place private rights of action in federal court and
accept some risk of conflict between public and private enforcement
regimes.
CONCLUSION
This Article begins a conversation regarding the relationship
between public and private enforcement in agency adjudication. It
shows that administrative enforcement is not merely another form of
public enforcement, only in a friendlier forum. Contrary to the
prevailing perception, private enforcement is deeply embedded in the
design of federal regulatory programs. In addition, this Article
provides a framework for thinking about how best to structure
administrative enforcement schemes to leverage the resources of
private parties in support of public policy.
Private enforcement in agency adjudication has important
implications for our understanding of the relationship between public
and private enforcement regimes more generally. Private enforcement
is often thought of as a way to avoid the use of a strong state
296. Stephenson, supra note 199, at 1058–59.
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bureaucracy in a political culture distrustful of “big government.”297
Under this view, each mode of enforcement generally proceeds in
federal court on its own track. Yet private enforcement in agency
adjudication challenges this view. Beyond simply providing a
nongovernmental enforcement mechanism, private enforcement is
critical to agencies’ ability to accomplish their missions. Private
enforcement facilitates access to regulatory remedies, enhances the
information of government regulators, and holds them accountable to
their statutory mandates.
Progressive and New Deal advocates of the regulatory state
feared that judicialization would hobble the administrative process.298
With the passage of the APA, judicialized procedures became well
established in formal adjudication and for a time made significant
inroads into rulemaking. But there has been a turn away from
judicialized procedures in recent decades as agencies, courts, and
scholars have made greater use of rulemaking and informal guidance,
finding judicial-like procedures burdensome, time consuming, and
ineffective. Yet far from hobbling the administrative process,
judicialized procedural rights for private parties may in some cases be
essential to protecting the goals Congress seeks to achieve with
regulatory agencies. Indeed, private rights in agency adjudication may
be especially important today, as presidents increasingly use
enforcement policies to roll back or amend statutory mandates outside
the legislative process.

297. KAGAN, supra note 54, at 15–16.
298. See 86 CONG. REC. 13,943 (1940) (message of the President accompanying a veto of an
early version of the Administrative Procedure Act, in which agency procedure was highly
judicialized); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfication with the Administration of
Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906) (identifying the shortcomings of judicial administration
characterized by an adversarial process).
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APPENDIX A
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT RIGHTS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS
A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Private
Rules of
Exclusive
Private
Right
Practice
Agency
Private
Agency
Parties to
of
and
Enforcement300 Complaints301 Investigation302 Enforcement303 Action304 Procedure

Administrative
Court

Agency
Enforcement 299

Commodity
Futures Trading
Commission—
Office of
Proceedings

X

X

Consumer
Financial
Protection
Bureau—
Office of
Administrative
Adjudication

X

X

Department of
Commerce—
Office of the
Assistant
Secretary for
Export
Administration

X

X

X

X

X

17 C.F.R.
Part 10

12 C.F.R.
Part 1081

X

15 C.F.R.
Part 766

299. The applicable administrative court hears cases in which the relevant agency has
enforcement responsibilities. The agency’s enforcement responsibilities might include one or
more of the following: reviewing and investigating complaints, attempting to settle disputes
between the parties, acting as a gatekeeper for private complaints, or exercising exclusive control
over enforcement actions adjudicated by the agency.
300. The administrative court hears claims in which the agency has exclusive authority
whether to pursue an enforcement action requiring an evidentiary hearing. However, other
nongovernmental parties besides the respondent may be able to obtain formal party status in
such cases.
301. The regulatory scheme provides private parties with the right to file complaints and
requires the agency to review the complaints in at least some case types. The agency’s review
may or may not include an independent investigation of the charges in the complaint.
302. The regulatory scheme provides for an agency investigation of the merits of some types
of complaints.
303. The regulatory scheme allows private parties other than respondents to participate in
some types of enforcement actions.
304. The regulatory scheme allows private parties to pursue some claims with or without the
participation of the agency.
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F.

G.

Private
Rules of
Exclusive
Private
Right
Practice
Agency
Private
Agency
Parties to
of
and
Enforcement300 Complaints301 Investigation302 Enforcement303 Action304 Procedure

Department of
Commerce—
U.S. Coast
Guard Office of
Administration

X

X

X

15 C.F.R.
Part 766

Department of
Energy—Office
of Hearings and
Appeals

X

X

X

X

X

X

10 C.F.R.
Part 1003

Department of
Energy—Office
of the Secretary

X

X

X

X

X

X

10 C.F.R.
Part 708

Department of
Health and
Human
Services—
Departmental
Appeals Board

X

X

Department of
Housing and
Urban
Development—
Office of the
Secretary

X

X

X

X

Department of
Justice—
Office of the
Chief
Administrative
Hearing Officer

X

X

X

X

Department of
Justice—
Office of the
Chief
Immigration
Judge

X

X

Department of
Labor—
Administrative
Review Board

X

X

Department of
Labor—Benefits
Review Board

X

21 C.F.R.
Part 17

24 C.F.R.
Part 26

28 C.F.R.
Part 68

X

8 C.F.R.
Part
1003,
subpart C

X

X

X

X

29 C.F.R.
Part 7

X

X

X

X

20 C.F.R.
Part 802
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E.

F.

G.

Private
Rules of
Exclusive
Private
Right
Practice
Agency
Private
Agency
Parties to
of
and
Enforcement300 Complaints301 Investigation302 Enforcement303 Action304 Procedure

Department of
Labor—Board
of Alien Labor
Certification
Appeals

X

X

Department of
Labor—Office of
Administrative
Law Judges

X

X

Department of
Treasury—
Office of
Administrative
Law Judges

X

X

Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission—
Office of Federal
Operations

X

Environmental
Protection
Agency—
Environmental
Appeals Board

X

Environmental
Protection
Agency—
Office of
Administrative
Law Judges

20 C.F.R.
Part 656

X

X

X

X

29 C.F.R.
Part 18

27 C.F.R.
Part 71

X

X

X

X

29 C.F.R.
Part 1603

X

X

X

X

X

40 C.F.R.
Part 22

X

X

X

X

X

X

40 C.F.R.
Part 22

Federal Election
Commission

X

X

X

X

Federal
Maritime
Commission—
Office of
Administrative
Law Judges

X

X

X

X

X

46 C.F.R.
Part 502

Federal Mine
Safety and
Health Review
Commission

X

X

X

X

X

29 C.F.R.
Part 2700

X

11 C.F.R.
Part 111
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Private
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Exclusive
Private
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Practice
Agency
Private
Agency
Parties to
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Enforcement300 Complaints301 Investigation302 Enforcement303 Action304 Procedure

Federal Mine
Safety and
Health Review
Commission—
Office of
Administrative
Law Judges

X

X

X

X

X

Federal Trade
Commission

X

X

X

X

X

16 C.F.R.
Part 3

Federal Trade
Commission—
Office of
Administrative
Law Judges

X

X

X

X

X

16 C.F.R.
Part 3

National Labor
Relations Board

X

X

X

X

X

29 C.F.R.
Part 102

National Labor
Relations
Board—Division
of Judges

X

X

X

X

X

29 C.F.R.
Part 102

National Labor
Relations
Board—
Regional Offices

X

X

X

X

X

29 C.F.R.
Part 102

National
Transportation
Safety Board

X

X

X

49 C.F.R.
Part 821

National
Transportation
Safety Board—
Office of ALJs

X

X

X

49 C.F.R.
Part 821

Occupational
Safety and
Health Review
Commission

X

X

X

29 C.F.R.
Part 2200

Occupational
Safety and
Health Review
Commission—
Office of the
Chief

X

X

X

29 C.F.R.
Part 2200

X

29 C.F.R.
Part 2700
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E.

F.

G.

Private
Rules of
Exclusive
Private
Right
Practice
Agency
Private
Agency
Parties to
of
and
Enforcement300 Complaints301 Investigation302 Enforcement303 Action304 Procedure

Surface
Transportation
Board

X

X

X

X

X

49 C.F.R.
Parts
1111 &
1122

United States
International
Trade
Commission

X

X

X

X

X

19 C.F.R.
Part 210

United States
International
Trade
Commission—
Office of
Administrative
Law Judges

X

X

X

X

X

19 C.F.R.
Part 210

Totals

34

25

22

25

15

28

